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SOME THOUGHTS ON THE STUDY OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR†
LEE EPSTEIN*
ABSTRACT
Back in the 1940s the political scientist C. Herman Pritchett began
tallying the votes and opinions of Supreme Court Justices. His goal
was to use data to test the hypothesis that the Justices were not only
following the “law,” but were also motivated by their own ideological
preferences.
With the hindsight of nearly eighty years, we know that Pritchett’s
seemingly small project helped to create a big field: Judicial Be-
havior, which I take to be the theoretical and empirical study of the
choices judges make. Political scientists continue to play a central
role, but they are now joined by economists, psychologists, historians,
and legal academics. I briefly explore their contributions. I also con-
sider other developments since Pritchett’s time, including the analy-
sis of judicial behavior abroad, the massive improvements in our
data, and the increasing number of topics under study. I conclude
with some directions the field might take in the next few years. All in
all, I am quite optimistic that the study of judicial behavior will
continue to hold an important place in the social sciences, history,
and, increasingly, I hope, law.
† A revised version of the 2015 George Wythe Lecture. 
* Lee Epstein is the Ethan A.H. Shepley Distinguished University Professor at Washing-
ton University in St. Louis. For their comments and helpful discussions, I am grateful to the
students and faculty at the William & Mary Law School. I also thank the National Science
Foundation, the Simon Guggenheim Foundation, and Washington University School of Law
for supporting my work on judicial behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
The name C. Herman Pritchett is probably unfamiliar to many in
the law community, but he was a very famous political scientist; a
prolific scholar;1 a great citizen of the University of Chicago, where
he spent much of his career;2 and a leader in the profession, serving
as the president of the American Political Science Association.3
But back in the fall of 1940, when Pritchett was just starting his
career, he had his “own version of Newton’s apple.”4 As he tells it:
I was reading the current issue of the Supreme Court Reporter
in my office at the University of Chicago, one floor above and
some thirty feet west of the inscription on the Social Science
Research Building which quotes Lord Kelvin’s statement that
“When you cannot measure, your knowledge is meager and
unsatisfactory,” when I was struck by what seemed a peculiar
combination of [J]ustices who had joined in a dissent to one of
the Supreme Court’s opinions. I began to wonder what it was in
that case and in the autobiographies of those [J]ustices that led
them to disagree with the majority of the Court on the issue
there raised.5
With this revelation, Pritchett set out to collect data on Supreme
Court Justices: the number of dissenting votes, the fraction of agree-
1. For a survey of his work, see Lawrence Baum, C. Herman Pritchett: Innovator with
an Ambiguous Legacy, in THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 57, 57-59 (Nancy Maveety ed.,
2003).
2. Walter F. Murphy, In Memoriam: Charles Herman Pritchett, 28 POL. SCI. & POL. 748,
749 (1995); see also Obituary: C. Herman Pritchett, Political Science, U. CHI. CHRON. (May 11,
1995), http://chronicle.uchicago.edu/950511/pritchett.shtml [https://perma.cc/2ZBG-JCDU].
3. APSA Presidents: 1903 to Present, AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N, http://www.apsanet.org/
ABOUT/Leadership-Governance/APSA-Presidents-1903-to-Present [https://perma.cc/CW3G-
VLHW] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
4. Charles Herman Pritchett, Political Science: Santa Barbara, CAL. DIGITAL LIBR., http://
texts.cdlib.org/view?docId=hb0z09n6nn;NAAN=13030&doc.view=frames&chunk.id=div000
51&toc.depth=1&toc.id=&brand=calisph%20ere [https://perma.cc/57JK-Z6LQ] (last visited
Apr. 15, 2016).
5. C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND
VALUES, 1937-1947, at xi (1948).
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ments with other Justices, their support for the federal government
in tax cases, and on and on.6
By today’s standards, Pritchett’s counting project seems small,
even quaint.7 But back in the 1940s, it was unique enough to gener-
ate some public interest. Arthur Krock of the New York Times wrote
of a young political scientist who was keeping “box scores” of the
votes and opinions of Supreme Court Justices.8 The Washington
Post was downright hostile to his methods. After Harvard Law
Professor Mark De Wolfe Howe “doubted ‘whether the statistical
analysis of Supreme Court opinions can, under any circumstances,
be fruitful[,]’.... [t]he Washington Post editorialized: ‘We hope that
Mr. Howe’s expose of this shallow thinking about the judicial pro-
cess will hasten the relegation of box scores to the sports pages—
where they belong.’”9 Pritchett took note of this criticism,10 but, “[a]s
an old White Sox fan, he was not offended.”11
Pritchett also knew he was not tallying votes just to tally votes.
His ideas were much deeper: he wanted to use data to test the hy-
pothesis that the Justices were not only following the “law”—text,
precedents, and the like—but were also motivated by their own
ideological preferences. To that end, he created matrices showing
the number of nonunanimous decisions in which pairs of Justices
voted together, as well as left-right continua.12 Operating under the
assumption that such comparisons revealed the Justices’ “‘liberal-
ism’ and ‘conservatism’ as those terms are understood by the man
6. Much of this is on display in PRITCHETT, supra note 5, at xii-xiii, and C. Herman
Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion Among Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1939-1941, 35 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 890, 892-94 (1941). 
7. I draw some of the material in the next few paragraphs from LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE
BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE
66, 69 (2013).
8. The original article was Arthur Krock, In the Nation: Alignments and Disputes in the
Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1944, at C18. The term “box score” appeared in a follow-
up piece: Arthur Krock, In the Nation: The Supreme Court’s Dissent Record Grows, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1946, at L24.
9. This story is recounted in C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON
COURT 189 (1954).
10. See id.
11. Murphy, supra note 2, at 749. Pritchett had the last laugh: the Harvard Law Review
now publishes “box scores” of their own in their annual report on the Supreme Court’s Term.
Id. Its statistics bear more than a familiar resemblance to the data Pritchett began compiling
in the 1940s. See id.
12. See Pritchett, supra note 6, at 893.
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in the street,”13 Pritchett concluded that ideology influenced the Jus-
tices’ decisions.14 (Figure 1 provides an example of what Pritchett
was up to, only I use today’s Justices and not the McReynolds,
Blacks, and Frankfurters who populated Pritchett’s Court.)
Figure 1. Left-Right Alignment of Current U.S. Supreme Court
Justices, 201515
I emphasize the “data” part of Pritchett’s project because it is the
crucial part. Without data, Pritchett would have been just another
legal realist: a writer making claims, however insightful, with only
examples and anecdotes to back them up.16 Having data to demon-
strate that the realists were right is, in part, what made Pritchett’s
ideas so powerful.17
And powerful they were. With the hindsight of nearly eighty
years, we know that Pritchett’s seemingly small project helped to
13. Id. at 895.
14. There is some debate over whether Pritchett thought ideology was the primary or even
exclusive driver of the Justices’ votes. I tend to side with Baum, who writes, “Pritchett was
a moderate realist,” meaning that he “saw judges as following their preferences within the
framework and constraints of legal reasoning.” Baum, supra note 1, at 60.
15. The Justices are organized from more liberal to more conservative based on their
Martin-Quinn scores for the 2014 Term. Measures, MARTIN-QUINN SCORES, http://mqscores.
berkeley.edu/measures.php [https://perma.cc/A74C-GXFS] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
16. For more on this point, see EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 66-67.
17. Though, truth be told, Pritchett was not the first to use data to study judicial behavior.
See id. at 66 n.3 (“Charles Grove Haines ... had examined the outcomes in New York City’s
courts of 17,000 prosecutions for public intoxication. Forty-one magistrates heard these cases,
and the results varied dramatically among them. One dismissed the charges against only one
of the 566 defendants he tried; another dismissed 54 percent. Only a few social scientists tried
to carry on Haines’s work until Pritchett picked up the banner after the Supreme Court’s
challenge to the New Deal.”).
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create a big field18: Judicial Behavior, which I take to be the
theoretical and empirical study19 of the choices judges make.20
Political scientists continue to play a central role, but they are
now joined by economists, psychologists, historians, and legal aca-
demics. In Part I, I briefly explore their important contributions. I
also consider other developments since Pritchett’s time, including
the study of judicial behavior abroad and the massive improvements
in data. These are not the only indicators of the field’s evolution.
Another is the number of substantive topics that have come under
analysis. Pritchett focused on the individual judge, and that re-
mains at the field’s core. But many other topics have come under
study, ten of which I consider quite briefly in Part II.
18. Even though Pritchett’s work attracted substantial attention, it took another decade
after publication of The Roosevelt Court, supra note 5, before others began to “construct[] on
the foundations that [Pritchett] built.” WALTER F. MURPHY & JOSEPH TANENHAUS, THE STUDY
OF PUBLIC LAW 19-20 (1972). By the early 1960s, Pritchett’s contribution was so apparent that
Glendon Schubert, another early pioneer of judicial behavior, dedicated a collection he edited
to C. Herman Pritchett, “who blazed a trail.” JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING (Glendon Schubert
ed., 1963). By 1995, Murphy declared, “no serious scholar would examine the work of the
Supreme Court—or any other multi-judge tribunal—without following Herman’s analytical
approach. Perhaps the ultimate compliment is that ... Herman’s contribution ... has become
so accepted as to appear common sensical.” Murphy, supra note 2, at 749.
Still, I want to emphasize that Pritchett helped create the field; there were other very
influential scholars, many of whom also emphasized the role of ideology on the Supreme
Court’s decision making. A short list includes: Walter F. Murphy (e.g., ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL
STRATEGY 2-3 (1964); Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court Power, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
1017, 1019-20 (1959)); Glendon Schubert (e.g., THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATTITUDES AND
IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, 1946-1963, at 5-6 (1965); The Study of Judicial
Decision-Making as an Aspect of Political Behavior, 52 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1007, 1022-25
(1958)); Harold J. Spaeth (e.g., AN INTRODUCTION TO SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 61-69
(rev. ed. 1972); An Analysis of Judicial Attitudes in the Labor Relations Decisions of the
Warren Court, 25 J. POL. 290, 310-11 (1963)); and S. Sidney Ulmer (e.g., The Political Party
Variable in the Michigan Supreme Court, 11 J. PUB. L. 352, 360-61 (1962)). For a complete list,
see THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 1.
19. That the study of judicial behavior is theoretical, empirical, or both distinguishes it
from “empirical legal studies,” a seemingly catch-all phrase for all work on law and legal
institutions that draws on facts about the world—that is, data (and usually quantified data).
There are many important studies of judicial behavior that have empirical implications
though are themselves purely theoretical (or nearly so). Recent examples include: Adam B.
Badawi & Scott Baker, Appellate Lawmaking in a Judicial Hierarchy, 58 J.L. & ECON. 139,
141-42 (2015); Anthony Niblett, Case-by-Case Adjudication and the Path of the Law, 42 J.
LEGAL STUD. 303, 322-24 (2013); Jeffrey K. Staton & Georg Vanberg, The Value of Vagueness:
Delegation, Defiance, and Judicial Opinions, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 504, 516 (2008).
20. Others offer slightly different definitions. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal, Judicial Behavior,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 19, 19 (Keith E. Whittington et al. eds.,
2008) (defining judicial behavior as “[w]hat do judges do and why do they do it”).
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I conclude with some directions the field might take in the next
few years.21 All in all, I am quite sanguine that the study of judicial
behavior will continue to hold an important place in the social sci-
ences, history, and, increasingly, I hope, law.
I. NOTES ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE STUDY OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR
It would be impossible in this short Article to describe the full
evolution of the study of judicial behavior from Pritchett through
today.22 In what follows, I focus on a few key developments: (1) the
influx of scholars from other disciplines; (2) the worldwide interest
in judging; and (3) improvements in data. I reserve discussion of
what may be the biggest change of all—the increase in the number
of substantive topics under analysis—for Part II.
A. Disciplines
Although I have not conducted a systematic study of the matter,
it is probably fair to say that interest in judicial behavior remains
highest among political scientists. But that is changing. Political
scientists are now joined by other social scientists, especially econo-
mists and psychologists, many of whom also have J.D.’s. Legal
historians and law professors are important players in the field too.
Needless to say, the influx of ideas from these disciplines has im-
proved the field in ways big and small.
Let me start with economists. Their theoretical and methodologi-
cal contributions to the study of judicial behavior are many—too
many to recount here. If forced to name just one, I would say they
have redirected attention from the political scientists’ emphasis on
ideology as the primary driver of judicial decisions to the many
21. In my lecture, I considered some criticisms of the study of judicial behavior. Because
Landes, Posner, and I have already addressed some of the more prominent critiques, see
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 50-63, I will not repeat them here.
22. Besides, others have already done it. See, e.g., id.; JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR: A READER IN
THEORY AND RESEARCH (Glendon Schubert ed., 1964); MURPHY & TANENHAUS, supra note 18;
Nancy Maveety, The Study of Judicial Behavior and the Discipline of Political Science, in THE
PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 1, at 1; C. Herman Pritchett, Public Law and
Judicial Behavior, 30 J. POL. 480, 496-509 (1968).
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other goals that judges pursue, whether legal, personal, or profes-
sional.23
I discuss some of these motivations in Part II, so it will suffice
here to provide a flavor of their work by focusing on one goal econ-
omists (and others) have highlighted: the judges’ desire to retain
their jobs. This goal was not on Pritchett’s radar screen because he
studied life-tenured federal judges.24 But once scholars turned to
state judges, most of whom must stand for reelection or retention to
stay in office, electoral motivations and their effect on judicial be-
havior moved to the fore.
There are many wonderful studies that make this connection, but
I especially admire a classic article by two economists, Alexander
Tabarrok and Eric Helland.25 Focusing on U.S. states that elect
their judges, the authors studied whether tort awards were higher
in cases brought by an in-state plaintiff against an out-of-state
defendant.26 They predicted that elected judges would be more likely
than appointed judges to rule in favor of plaintiffs because “redis-
tribut[ing] wealth from out-of-state businesses to in-state plaintiffs”
would help them win reelection.27 Using a variety of statistical
methods,28 Tabarrok and Helland reported that their hypothesis
held: “[T]he expected total award in ... elected states with out-of-
state defendants is approximately $240,000 higher than in other
states.”29
23. Jack Knight and I reviewed this large literature in Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Recon-
sidering Judicial Preferences, 16 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 11, 18-19 (2013). As we noted, political
scientists and legal academics also played a role in forcing us to reconsider the preferences
of judges. See id. at 15-16.
24. Still, federal judges on the United States courts of appeals and district courts have
related motivations: the desire for promotion. See infra Part II.A.
25. Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort
Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157, 186-87 (1999) (“Elected judges know they rule at the discretion
of the voters, and, like other politicians, they rule accordingly.”).
26. See id. at 161-62.
27. Id. at 157. The story is a little more complicated than this because Tabarrok and
Helland compared awards in partisan-elected states (where judges identify their partisan
affiliation), nonpartisan states (where judges run for reelection but not on a partisan ballot),
and nonelected states. 
28. Andrew Martin and I discussed the logic behind their study in some detail in LEE
EPSTEIN & ANDREW D. MARTIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 144-48
(2014).
29. Tabarrok & Helland, supra note 25, at 186.
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More recent and equally strong work has come from the team of
Joanna Shepherd, an economist by training,30 and Michael Kang, a
J.D./Ph.D. in government.31 In one article, they demonstrate that
the desire to be reelected—and the need for campaign contribu-
tions—is such a driving force for state supreme court justices who
run on a partisan ballot that “every dollar of contributions from
business groups” raises the probability that the justice will rule in
favor of business.32 In another study, Shepherd and Kang show that
“the more [television] ads aired during ... judicial elections..., the
less likely justices are to vote in favor of criminal defendants.”33 The
results of the Shepherd-Kang studies have been so relevant to de-
bates over judicial selection here and abroad that not only have
scholars cited them in law reviews and social science journals,34 but
judges35 and media outlets36 have referenced the findings as well.37
30. See Experts: Joanna Shepherd, GLOBAL ECON. GROUP, http://www.globaleconomics
group.com/experts/joanna-shepherd-bailey/# [https://perma.cc/T4C8-XM62] (last visited Apr.
15, 2016).
31. See Faculty Profiles: Michael S. Kang, EMORY U. SCH. L., http://law.emory.edu/faculty-
and-scholarship/faculty-profiles/kang-profile.html [https://perma.cc/EQ93-LM5Y] (last visited
Apr. 15, 2016).
32. Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical
Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 73 (2011).
33. Joanna Shepherd & Michael S. Kang, Skewed Justice: Citizens United, Television
Advertising and State Supreme Court Justices’ Decisions in Criminal Cases, SKEWED JUST.,
http://skewedjustice.org [https://perma.cc/84HJ-ZNTJ] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
34. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory Inter-
pretation, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1236 n.82, 1262 n.183 (2012); Yasmin Dawood, Campaign
Finance and American Democracy, 18 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 329, 341 (2015); Timothy Werner
& John J. Coleman, Citizens United, Independent Expenditures, and Agency Costs: Reexam-
ining the Political Economy of State Antitakeover Statutes, 31 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 127, 134
(2015).
35. See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1675 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., con-
curring); Sanders Cty. Republican Cent. Comm. v. Bullock, 698 F.3d 741, 750 (9th Cir. 2012)
(Schroeder, J., dissenting).
36. See, e.g., Niraj Chokshi, How Judicial Campaign Ads May Be Affecting Legal
Decisions, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/
2014/10/22/how-judicial-campaign-ads-may-be-affecting-legal-decisions/ [https://perma.cc/QW
9B-AZQJ]; Joe Pinsker, It’s Cheaper to Buy a Judge than a State Senator, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2,
2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/11/its-cheaper-to-buy-a-judge-than-a-
state-senator/382198 [https://perma.cc/B69H-KKJN]; Derek Willis, ‘Soft on Crime’ TV Ads
Affect Judges’ Decisions, Not Just Elections, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1pwD1
qW# [https://perma.cc/R6MM-VPDE].
37. Both teams (Kang/Shepherd and Tabarrok/Helland) focused (mostly) on civil litigation.
See generally Kang & Shepherd, supra note 32; Tabarrok & Helland, supra note 25. A
substantial amount of work has analyzed criminal cases, and though the studies vary in their
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Though they may be outnumbered by political scientists and econ-
omists working in the field, psychologists too have made substantial
contributions to our understanding of judicial behavior38— but none
more so than Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, a law professor at Cornell with
a Ph.D. in psychology; Chris Guthrie, a J.D. with advanced training
in psychology; and Andrew J. Wistrich, a magistrate judge. In an
impressive series of papers,39 they report the results of experiments
they performed on judges to see if the judges can convert their intu-
itive “emotional reactions into orderly, rational responses.”40 Not
surprisingly, they can’t. Because I think the Rachlinkski et al.
findings are so important and will be even more so going forward,
I return to them in the Conclusion.
I am equally impressed with the work of legal historians. A study
by Daniel Klerman, a J.D./Ph.D. in history (with an economic bent),
and Paul Mahoney, the dean of the University of Virginia School of
Law, well illustrates the importance of historical work on judging.
details, their findings are uniform: judges who face the electorate to retain their jobs are
especially tough on criminal defendants, in part because the public does not like judges who
appear soft on crime. Cf. Kang & Shepherd, supra note 32, at 128-29 (making the similar
finding that judges who face the electorate are more likely to favor contributors’ interests).
For example, in their examination of more than 22,000 criminal sentences imposed by
Pennsylvania trial court judges, Sanford Gordon and Gregory Huber found that judges are
significantly harsher on defendants as the judges’ retention election grows closer. See Gregory
A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs
for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 248 (2004). Overall, the researchers “attribute at least
1,818 to 2,705 years of additional prison time to this electoral dynamic.” Id.; see also Carlos
Berdejó & Noam Yuchtman, Crime, Punishment, and Politics: An Analysis of Political Cycles
in Criminal Sentencing, 95 REV. ECON. & STAT. 741, 741-42 (2013); Sanford C. Gordon &
Gregory A. Huber, The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent Behavior, 2 Q.J. POL.
SCI. 107, 111 (2007); Melinda Gann Hall, Constituent Influence in State Supreme Courts:
Conceptual Notes and a Case Study, 49 J. POL. 1117, 1120-21 (1987). For even more state
court studies, see the bibliography in EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 97-98.
38. This team has made great contributions, but there are others who have produced
equally interesting and important work along similar lines. See, e.g., EILEEN BRAMAN, LAW,
POLITICS, AND PERCEPTION: HOW POLICY PREFERENCES INFLUENCE LEGAL REASONING (2009);
Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of Potentially
Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 113 (1994);
Dan Simon & Nicholas Scurich, Judicial Overstating, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 411 (2013).
39. E.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV.
777 (2001); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009); Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Heart Versus Head: Do Judges
Follow the Law or Follow Their Feelings?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 855 (2015).
40. Wistrich et al., supra note 39, at 863.
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In The Value of Judicial Independence, the two join an important
conversation about the relationship between judicial independence
and economic prosperity.41 The hypothesis, in a nutshell, is that
when courts are independent from the government, they are more
willing to enforce contract and property rights,42 which, in turn, en-
courages economic investment and growth. But instead of testing it
against contemporary data, as social scientists usually do,43
Klerman and Mahoney had the clever idea of looking back—to
England in the 1700s.44 They show that eighteenth-century laws
providing greater job security to the judges increased the value of
financial assets.45
Many of the scholars I have referenced have a Ph.D., but a Ph.D.
is hardly necessary to analyze the choices judges make. To the con-
trary, J.D.s have become active and insightful contributors to the
field. There are so many interesting and well-executed studies by
law professors that it would take several articles to explore them in
the detail they deserve. So I will mention just a few. In an influen-
tial study, my colleague at the Washington University School of Law
Pauline Kim mounted a compelling challenge to the standard social
science account of the relationship between higher and lower
courts46 (a subject to which I return in Part II). Throughout his ca-
reer, the late Ted Eisenberg wrote on judicial behavior47—including
a series of studies on the decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court,
41. See Daniel M. Klerman & Paul G. Mahoney, The Value of Judicial Independence: Evi-
dence from Eighteenth Century England, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 6-7, 23-25 (2005) (finding
that judicial independence yielded positive economic effects not only by increasing the reliabil-
ity of government debt, but also by better securing property and contract rights and enabling
increased predictability for the liabilities attendant to agency relationships).
42. See, e.g., Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The
Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J.
ECON. HIST. 803, 819 (1989).
43. E.g., Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross-
Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators, 19 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 497, 498 (2003); Rafael
La Porta et al., Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL. ECON. 445, 468 (2004).
44. See Klerman & Mahoney, supra note 41, at 1.
45. See id. at 10-12.
46. Pauline T. Kim, Beyond Principal-Agent Theories: Law and the Judicial Hierarchy,
105 NW. U. L. REV. 535, 538 (2011).
47. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and
the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257
(1995); Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Judge-Jury Difference in Punitive Damages
Awards: Who Listens to the Supreme Court?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 325 (2011). 
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which he co-authored with Israeli scholars.48 Eric Posner, Mitu
Gulati, and Stephen Choi49 have written on many features of
judging, including judicial performance. In their much-debated arti-
cle Are Judges Overpaid?, they focus on the chronic complaint (at
least among judges) that judges are so inadequately paid that the
courts eventually will be filled with “less capable judges,” leading to
“inferior adjudication.”50 Choi et al. put this claim to the test, ana-
lyzing whether higher judicial salaries lead to better judicial perfor-
mance.51 The results show that the correlation between salary and
quality is not as strong as the pay-raise proponents maintain.52 And
then there is Barry Friedman’s book on the effect of public opinion
on the Supreme Court.53 Not only has it been wildly influential in its
own right, it has also become a must-cite in the more quantified
social science literature on the topic.54 (I return to Friedman in Part
II.)
Judges have gotten into the act too. Richard A. Posner’s books
and articles on “how judges think” are rightfully famous.55 And at an
48. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., Does the Judge Matter? Exploiting Random
Assignment on a Court of Last Resort to Assess Judge and Case Selection Effects, 9 J. EMPIRI-
CAL LEGAL STUD. 246 (2012); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Israel’s Supreme Court Appellate
Jurisdiction: An Empirical Study, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 693 (2011); Theodore Eisenberg et al.,
When Courts Determine Fees in a System with a Loser Pays Norm: Fee Award Denials to
Winning Plaintiffs and Defendants, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1452 (2013).
49. Okay, Choi has a Ph.D. in economics. See Stephen Choi and David Yermack Are
Appointed Directors of the Pollack Center for Law & Business, N.Y.U. L. (Nov. 8, 2013), http://
www.law.nyu.edu/news/stephen-choi-and-david-yermack-directors-of-pollack-center-for-law-
and-business [https://perma.cc/L52C-K6YA].
50. Stephen J. Choi et al., Are Judges Overpaid? A Skeptical Response to the Judicial
Salary Debate, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 47, 48 (2009) (quoting Justice Alito).
51. See id. at 47, 50.
52. See id. at 50, 102; see also James M. Anderson & Eric Helland, How Much Should
Judges Be Paid? An Empirical Study on the Effect of Judicial Pay on the State Bench, 64
STAN. L. REV. 1277, 1277 (2012) (finding that “judicial salaries have a small but significant
effect on the likelihood of exit and ... on the background of judges that join the appellate
bench”).
53. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
54. See, e.g., Matthew E.K. Hall et al., Holding Steady on Shifting Sands: Counter-
majoritarian Decision Making in the US Courts of Appeals, 79 PUB. OPINION Q. 504, 506
(2015); Stefanie A. Lindquist & Pamela C. Corley, National Policy Preferences and Judicial
Review of State Statutes at the United States Supreme Court, 43 PUBLIUS 151, 152 (2013);
Joseph Daniel Ura, Backlash and Legitimation: Macro Political Responses to Supreme Court
Decisions, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 110, 111-12, 124 (2014).
55. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008); RICHARD A. POSNER,
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advanced degree program at Duke University Law School where
judges study judicial behavior (among other topics),56 the “students”
have gone on to publish interesting studies on the topic.57
B. Worldwide Interest
As even this brief review shows, there is still a good deal of
emphasis on United States courts, and many of the key studies are
conducted by American scholars. But this too is changing,58 as the
Eisenberg team’s research on the Israeli Supreme Court makes
clear.59 More to the point—and despite the continued dominance of
U.S. authors and courts—there is almost no corner of the world
whose judges are not under analysis by some scholar somewhere.
Through these analyses, we have learned a great deal about the
choices of judges in other societies of course, but also about our own
judges. For example, to understand the effect of life tenure on judg-
ing, we need points of comparison. Kang and Shepherd’s research on
REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING (2013); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?
(The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993).
56. See Master of Judicial Studies, DUKE L., https://law.duke.edu/judicialstudies/degree/#
[https://perma.cc/BEZ2-V8S3] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016) (a master’s program “open to state,
federal, and international judges who sit on courts of general jurisdiction”).
57. See, e.g., Kem Thompson Frost, Predictability in the Law, Prized yet Not Promoted: A
Study in Judicial Priorities, 67 BAYLOR L. REV. 48 (2015) (analyzing judicial priorities);
George C. Hanks, Jr., Searching from Within: The Role of Magistrate Judges in Federal Multi-
District Litigation, 8 FED. CTS. L. REV. 35, 37 (2015) (arguing that “district courts are using
magistrate judges ... as the primary resource for assistance in managing multi-district
litigation”). 
58. And it should change, for the reasons I discuss in the Conclusion.
59. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. This is not to stay that the comparative
analysis of courts is entirely new. In the 1960s and 1970s, some of the “pioneers” of judicial
behavior began to study—or at least think about—courts elsewhere. Also in the 1960s, David
J. Danelski wrote a series of papers and book chapters on the Japanese Supreme Court. See
Thomas G. Walker, David J. Danelski: Social Psychology and Group Choice, in THE PIONEERS
OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 1, at 248, 266 (listing Danelski’s works). And there were
some important books in the 1990s, especially by Alec Stone and Charles R. Epp. See CHARLES
R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE (1998); ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL COUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1992) (analyzing European constitutional
courts). But it took another decade before the study really took off. See the data I report in
Lee Epstein, The Comparative Advantage, 9 LAW & CTS. 1, 1 (1999), http://epstein.wustl.edu/
research/compadv.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DRJ-XJDU] (showing that even as recently as fifteen
years ago, the number of rigorous analyses of courts abroad was quite limited).
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the state courts provides some,60 but moving to a comparative con-
text provides even more. The worldwide variation of judicial selec-
tion-retention mechanisms is so high that it is hard to imagine one
that does not exist.61
To get a feel for the importance of moving beyond U.S. courts, let
me start with research on judges in Latin America. For many rea-
sons, courts there have long been of interest to political scientists,
though in my opinion (others may differ) it was Gretchen Helmke’s
work in the early 2000s that started the cascade of rigorous research
we see today.62 Helmke focused on Argentina, a country whose con-
stitution reads quite similar to ours regarding tenure for judges.63
There, as here, the constitution guarantees that judges “shall hold
their offices during good behavior.”64 Helmke shows, however, that
in Argentina, this is a parchment guarantee: “good behavior” does
not mean tenure for life; it means tenure for the life of the appoint-
ing regime.65 As Helmke writes, “incoming governments in Argen-
tina routinely get rid of their predecessors’ judges despite constitu-
tional guarantees.”66 Out of fear for their jobs and/or even their
lives, Helmke theorized that the judges would rationally anticipate
the threat and begin “strategic[ally] defecting,” that is, ruling
against the existing regime once it began to lose power.67 The data
confirmed her hypothesis.68
60. See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 32, at 69.
61. For those in Europe alone, see Lee Epstein et al., Comparing Judicial Selection
Systems, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 7, 10-11 (2001).
62. For an overview of the “unprecedented boom in the study of courts as political actors
in Latin America,” see Diana Kapiszewski & Matthew M. Taylor, Doing Courts Justice?
Studying Judicial Politics in Latin America, 6 PERSP. ON POL. 741, 741 (2008).
63. See Gretchen Helmke, The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-Executive Relations in
Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 291, 291-92 (2002); see
also GRETCHEN HELMKE, COURTS UNDER CONSTRAINTS: JUDGES, GENERALS, AND PRESIDENTS
IN ARGENTINA 14, 15 (2005).
64. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that, inter alia, “[t]he Judges ... shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour”). In the Argentine Republic, the official English translation
of the Constitución Nacional similarly provides that “[t]he Justices of the Supreme Court and
the judges of the lower courts ... shall hold their offices during good behavior.” Art. 110,
CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.).
65. See Helmke, supra note 63, at 292.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 291.
68. See id. at 296-97, 300-01.
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Many more studies of Latin American judges have followed. Some
are explicitly cross-national; others focus on a particular country.69
Either way, like Helmke’s studies, they carry important implica-
tions well beyond the confines of the region, whether for the analy-
sis of judicial selection and retention, relations between courts and
the elected branches, or judicial independence, among others.
Equally compelling work is on its way as scholars within the coun-
tries are conducting systematic investigations of their own. Julio
Ríos-Figueroa’s new book is an example,70 as is research by Bra-
zilian scholars, led by law professor Ivar Hartmann, who are
collaborating with their high court to create a database of all the
Court’s decisions.71
Studies on European judges are also numerous—especially those
on judges serving on so-called peak or apex courts.72 A few countries
in Europe have legal systems that resemble ours: three levels, with
judges on all three levels able to examine laws for their compatibil-
ity with the constitution and invalidate laws that are incompatible.
In these countries, as in the United States, the apex court is usually
called the “supreme court.” The Norwegian Supreme Court is an
69. See, e.g., Daniel Brinks, Judicial Reform and Independence in Brazil and Argentina:
The Beginning of a New Millennium?, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 595 (2005); David Landau, The Two
Discourses in Colombian Constitutional Jurisprudence: A New Approach to Modeling Judicial
Behavior in Latin America, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 687 (2005).
70. JULIO RÍOS-FIGUEROA, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS MEDIATORS: ARMED CONFLICT,
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA (2016).
71. Most of their papers are in Portuguese. For one in English, see Diego Werneck
Arguelhes & Ivar A. Hartmann, Timing Control Without Docket Control: How Individual
Justices Shape the Brazilian Supreme Court’s Agenda (May 28, 2014) (unpublished paper pre-
sented at the Conference on Empirical Studies on Constitutional Courts, FGV Direito Rio, Rio
de Janeiro, Brazil) (on file with author). 
72. I do not mean to imply that work is limited to peak courts; there are plenty of studies
on the “ordinary” courts in Europe. See, e.g., Taavi Annus & Margit Tavits, Judicial Behavior
After a Change of Regime: The Effects of Judge and Defendant Characteristics, 38 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 711, 711 (2004) (examining the decisions of trial courts in Estonia); Nuno Garoupa et al.,
Political Influence and Career Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Administrative Review by the
Spanish Supreme Court, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 795, 797-98 (2012); Alessandro Melcarne
& Giovanni B. Ramello, Judicial Independence, Judges’ Incentives and Efficiency, 11 REV. L.
& ECON. 149, 150 (2015) (examining judicial performance based on data supplied by the
Council of Europe); Eli Salzberger & Paul Fenn, Judicial Independence: Some Evidence from
the English Court of Appeal, 42 J.L. & ECON. 831, 831 (1999) (evaluating the debate on judicial
independence using evidence from the English Court of Appeal from 1951-1986).
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example and has been the subject of a terrific new book devoted to
exploring its behavior.73
But most European countries do not allow their “ordinary” courts,
not even their supreme court, to exercise constitutional review. They
reserve this function for constitutional courts to which, depending
on the country, the ordinary courts can refer constitutional matters,
or in which individuals or members of the government can bring
constitutional questions in the first instance and in the abstract
(that is, absent a real case or controversy).74 The idea of empowering
one court with constitutional review power is not new,75 but its sys-
tematic study is at a relatively early stage.
Even so, we have already learned a lot. Among the many excellent
papers and books, I think of Georg Vanberg’s work on the German
Constitutional Court,76 perhaps the most influential national court
in Europe. Vanberg takes on questions that dominate discussions
not only about courts in Europe but throughout the world, including
whether “the potential for evasion” of court decisions by the elected
branches and the public “shape[s] judicial deliberations and per-
haps even decisions” and “[u]nder what circumstances [courts can]
successfully constrain legislative majorities, and when will they not
do so.”77 Alec Stone’s study of the French Constitutional Council has
also been quite influential—first, for bringing attention to the very
fact that constitutional courts in Europe exercise abstract review,78
and second, for suggesting that their exercise of this power opens
the door for “constitutional courts [to] behave as third legislative
chambers.”79
73. See GUNNAR GRENDSTAD ET AL., POLICY MAKING IN AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY (2015).
74. See, e.g., Bojan Bugaric, Courts as Policy-Makers: Lessons from Transition, 42 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 247, 250-61 (2001).
75. See Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional Review?,
30 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 587, 589-90 (2014).
76. See GEORG VANBERG, THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN GERMANY (2005).
77. Id. at 8.
78. See STONE, supra note 59, at 225. For another interesting study on the French Consti-
tutional Council, see Raphaël Franck, Judicial Independence Under a Divided Polity: A Study
of the Rulings of the French Constitutional Court, 1959-2006, 25 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 262 (2009).
79. STONE, supra note 59, at 225. I should also note that judicial behavior in postcom-
munist constitutional courts has not escaped attention either, with many papers focused on
judicial independence. E.g., Lee Epstein et al., The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Estab-
lishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 117
(2001); Erik S. Herron & Kirk A. Randazzo, The Relationship Between Independence and Judi-
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As the study of national courts in Europe has gained steam, so too
has the analysis of relations between the domestic institutions and
the European courts. Clifford Carrubba and his colleagues, for
example, show that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is quite at-
tentive to the preferences and likely actions of EU member states
when it reaches its decisions.80 Assuming the ECJ cares about influ-
encing public policy, rational anticipation of the reaction of govern-
ments in a position to thwart its decisions makes good sense.81
Based on discussions at a recent conference of European judges and
scholars,82 I predict even more research along these lines, as well as
the analysis of communication among domestic European courts.83
Some refer to this as a dialogue, but it may also be viewed as a
competition among judges for influence in developing European law.
The study of judicial behavior in Asia is also thriving. Perhaps
because of “its central role in Indian political life and [its] massive
docket,”84 not to mention the sheer number of judges and court-
rooms, the Supreme Court of India has long been the subject of rig-
orous analysis, and the work continues.85 Nick Robinson’s interesting
cial Review in Post-Communist Courts, 65 J. POL. 422 (2003); Shannon Ishiyama Smithey &
John Ishiyama, Judicial Activism in Post-Communist Politics, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 719
(2002).
80. See Clifford J. Carrubba et al., Judicial Behavior Under Political Constraints: Evi-
dence from the European Court of Justice, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 435, 449 (2008).
81. But see Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas Brunnell, The European Court of Justice, State
Noncompliance, and the Politics of Override, 106 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 204 (2012) (taking issue
with the findings of the Carrubba et al. study). Carrubba and his colleagues responded in Clif-
ford J. Carubba et al., Understanding the Role of the European Court of Justice in European
Integration, 106 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 214 (2012). 
82. Program for the International Conference on Supreme Courts in Context (Univ. in
Bergen, Sept. 21-22, 2015), http://www.stj.pt/ficheiros/Noticias/ActividadeInstitucional/prog
ramfortheinternationalconferenceonsupremecourtsincontext2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ASH-
EW77].
83. And more research on the European (and international) courts themselves. Examples
include: Yonatan Lupu & Erik Voeten, Precedent in International Courts: A Network Analysis
of Case Citations by the European Court of Human Rights, 42 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 413 (2012);
Michael Malecki, Do ECJ Judges All Speak with the Same Voice? Evidence of Divergent
Preferences from the Judgments of Chambers, 19 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 59 (2011); Eric A. Posner
& Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, Is the International Court of Justice Biased?, 34 J. LEGAL STUD.
599 (2005).
84. Nick Robinson, A Quantitative Analysis of the Indian Supreme Court’s Workload, 10
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 570, 571 (2013).
85. E.g., RAJEEV DHAVAN, LITIGATION EXPLOSION IN INDIA (1986); see also George H. Gad-
bois, Jr., Indian Judicial Behaviour, 5 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 149 (1970); George H. Gadbois,
Jr., Indian Supreme Court Judges: A Portrait, 3 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 317 (1968); Robert Moog,
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article, for example, shows that the court disproportionately draws
its cases from states close to Delhi and the wealthy.86
Likewise, J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric Rasmusen’s work has
taught us much about the Japanese Supreme Court,87 but its lessons
transcend judges sitting on that court. To see this, consider the long-
standing debate in the formal economics literature over the extent
to which reputation- or power-seeking judges ought to be followers
(applying existing doctrine) or more avant garde. Some contend that
judges motivated by esteem should be less willing to follow prece-
dent to show that they are more capable than their predecessors.88
William Landes and Richard Posner, though, suggest that appellate
review keeps rogue judges—those who feel free to disregard prece-
dents in their quest for power or policy—in check.89 Perhaps judges
who are too innovative run the risk of seeing their decisions over-
turned, which can harm their reputation. Because Ramseyer and
Rasmusen show that Japanese judges who are reversed receive less
prestigious responsibilities,90 their analysis, I think, lends some sup-
port to Landes and Posner’s account.91
As for the Mideast, I have already mentioned work on the Israeli
Supreme Court.92 And there are many other studies. Among the
most striking is Moses Shayo and Asaf Zussman’s analysis of the
decisions of Israeli small claims courts, which shows that Jewish
Indian Litigiousness and the Litigation Explosion: Challenging the Legend, 33 ASIAN SURV.
1136 (1993) (looking at litigation in India’s district courts); see also, e.g., SHYLASHRI SHANKAR,
SCALING JUSTICE: INDIA’S SUPREME COURT, SOCIAL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (2009);
Abhinav Chandrachud, An Empirical Study of the Supreme Court’s Composition, 46 ECON. &
POL. WKLY. 71 (2011); Robinson, supra note 84.
86. See Robinson, supra note 84, at 570.
87. See, e.g., J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, The Case for Managed Judges:
Learning from Japan After the Political Upheaval of 1993, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1879 (2006) ; J.
Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Are Japanese Judges So Conservative in Politically
Charged Cases?, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 331 (2001) [hereinafter Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Japa-
nese Judges]; J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why the Japanese Taxpayer Always
Loses, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 571 (1999) [hereinafter Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Taxpayer].
88. See, e.g., Gilat Levy, Careerist Judges and the Appeals Process, 36 RAND J. ECON. 275,
277 (2005).
89. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 273 (1976).
90. See Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Taxpayer, supra note 87, at 573-74, 590, 594.
91. Cf. Salzberger & Fenn, supra note 72, at 846 (showing that the lower the reversal rate,
the higher the judge’s prestige and thus, the higher the likelihood of promotion from the Court
of Appeal to the House of Lords in England). 
92. See supra note 48.
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judges favor Jewish litigants, and Arab judges favor Arab litigants.93
Then there is Shai Danziger, Jonathan Levav, and Liora Avnaim-
Pesso’s study of the effect of food breaks on the decisions of judges
serving on Israeli parole boards.94 Their finding that judges are
more lenient at the beginning of the work day and after a food
break95 received worldwide attention (though subsequently came
under some criticism96). And anyone interested in the role of courts
in promoting economic development and political reform in author-
itarian regimes should read Tamir Moustafa’s book on the Egyptian
high court.97
C. Data
I could go on; there are many other interesting studies to refer-
ence.98 But let me turn to another important development in the
study of judicial behavior: the marked improvement of our data.
Just think about the way that Pritchett and the other pioneers of
93. See Moses Shayo & Asaf Zussman, Judicial Ingroup Bias in the Shadow of Terrorism,
126 Q.J. ECON. 1447, 1499 (2011) (“[T]he data seem to indicate that terrorism affects judges
of both ethnicities, leading Arab judges to favor Arab plaintiffs and Jewish judges to favor
Jewish plaintiffs.”). For equally good studies of ethnic in-group bias in the criminal context,
see Oren Gazal-Ayal & Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan, Let My People Go: Ethnic In-Group Bias
in Judicial Decisions—Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment, 7 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 403 (2010), and Guy Grossman et al., Descriptive Representation and Judicial
Outcomes in Multiethnic Societies, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 44 (2016).
94. See Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. U.S. 6889 (2011).
95. Id. at 6890.
96. See Keren Weinshall-Margel & John Shapard, Overlooked Factors in the Analysis of
Parole Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. E833 (2011).
97. TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: LAW, POLITICS, AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT (2007). See also his insightful review of the literature on
the role of courts in authoritarian regimes, Tamir Moustafa, Law and Courts in Authoritarian
Regimes, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 281 (2014).
98. For example, there are many excellent systematic studies of the Canadian Supreme
Court. See, e.g., ROY B. FLEMMING, TOURNAMENT OF APPEALS: GRANTING JUDICIAL REVIEW IN
CANADA (2004); C.L. OSTBERG & MATTHEW E. WETSTEIN, ATTITUDINAL DECISION MAKING IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (2007); DONALD R. SONGER ET AL., LAW, IDEOLOGY, AND
COLLEGIALITY: JUDICIAL BEHAVIOUR IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (2012). There are
fewer studies of courts in Africa. Exceptions include: THEUNIS ROUX, THE POLITICS OF
PRINCIPLE: THE FIRST SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, 1995-2005 (2013); JENNIFER
A. WIDNER, BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW (2001); Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg, The South
African Constitutional Court and Socio-Economic Rights as ‘Insurance Swaps’, 4 CONST. CT.
REV. 1 (2011).
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judicial behavior likely collected their data99: Either they or their
research assistants made their way into a law library where they
pulled off the shelves (hard!) copies of the U.S. Reports and went
through the cases one by one, noting the issues involved and mark-
ing down (maybe even with a pencil!), say, the number of Justices
in the majority, the number of dissenting opinions, and the ideologi-
cal outcome of the case.
Some of the authors I have referenced may have also proceeded
in this way when they created their datasets (though I doubt they
used hard copies of cases, what with electronic versions all over the
Internet). But many more likely relied on public or multiuser data-
bases—databases that are not tailored to a particular study but are
so rich in content that many scholars, even those with distinct pro-
jects, can draw on them.100
The United States Supreme Court Database,101 the brainchild of
Harold J. Spaeth, was among the first of these efforts, and it contin-
ues to serve as a foundation for virtually all empirical analyses of
the Court.102 That database is now joined by many others, including
Donald R. Songer’s U.S. Appeals Courts Database, housing informa-
tion on cases decided in the courts of appeals between 1925 and
2002,103 and the National High Courts Judicial Database,104 pro-
viding data on the decisions of apex courts in eleven countries.105
99. I do not know for sure, but I have heard countless stories from my mentors.
100. In addition to opening access to many researchers, large multiuser databases have
what is known as a combinatoric advantage. For more details, see EPSTEIN & MARTIN, supra
note 28, at 16-18.
101. SUP. CT. DATABASE, http://supremecourtdatabase.org [https://perma.cc/7VNV-AEKX]
(last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
102. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Chief Justice John Roberts Amasses a Conservative Record,
and Wrath from the Right, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/
us/politics/chief-justice-john-roberts-amasses-conservative-record-and-the-rights-ire.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/Z55R-SKCQ]; Adam Liptak, Right Divided, a Disciplined Left Steered the Su-
preme Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/us/supreme-
court-tacks-left-with-push-from-disciplined-liberals.html [https://perma.cc/D2QG-M6PV].
103. U.S. Appeals Courts Database, JUD. RES. INITIATIVE U.S.C., http://artsandsciences.sc.
edu/poli/juri/appct.htm [https://perma.cc/EKN7-T6CF] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
104. National High Courts Database, JUD. RES. INITIATIVE U.S.C., http://artsandsciences.sc.
edu/poli/juri/highcts.htm [https://perma.cc/2FZ6-BB6Z] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
105. Id. The courts (and years) covered are: High Court of Australia (1969-2003); Supreme
Court of Canada (1969-2003); Supreme Court of India (1970-2000); Supreme Court of Namibia
(1990-1998); Supreme Court of the Philippines (1970-2003); South Africa Supreme Court of
Appeal (1970-2000) and Constitutional Court (1995-2000); Tanzania Court of Appeal (1983-
1998); Judicial Committee of the House of Lords (Law Lords) of the United Kingdom (1970-
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Many similar data-collection efforts are underway all over the
world.
To be sure, multiuser databases are not panaceas; they cannot di-
rectly answer every question scholars may have about the behavior
of judges. But researchers can adapt them—and even more tailored
databases106—to suit their needs.107 Consider the National High
Courts Judicial Database, which contains a good deal of information
on the Indian Supreme Court’s decisions between 1970 and 2000.108
Following the Database’s protocols, users can update or even back-
date the dataset. They can also create new variables. For example,
although the Database provides information on how the judges
voted and whether they wrote an opinion, it does not include data
on the judges’ background characteristics (for example, age, gender,
and previous positions). Because this information is available on the
Indian Supreme Court’s website109 (and perhaps from other sources),
analysts could add it to the dataset.
That scholars are now doing so seems evident. More to the point,
I have no doubt that the existence of these multiuser databases has
contributed quite productively to the study of judicial behavior. To
see this, we need consider only that just a few short decades ago,
prior to the appearance of Songer’s United States Appeals Courts
Database,110 the circuit courts received only limited systematic
attention111; the great bulk of research focused on the United States
Supreme Court. No longer. Today, there is an explosion of work on
2002); Supreme Court of the United States (1953-2005); Supreme Court of Zambia (1973-
1997); Supreme Court of Zimbabwe (1989-2000). Id.
106. An example is Sunstein et al.’s data on the United States courts of appeals. See CASS
R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY (2006). Although Sunstein et al. developed the dataset for a particular research
project, other scholars have adapted it to their own needs. We did so in our article on gender
and judging by adding, among other variables, the gender of the judge. See Christina L. Boyd,
Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 389, 408 (2010).
107. See EPSTEIN & MARTIN, supra note 28, at 68.
108. See National High Courts Database, supra note 104.
109. See Hon’ble The Chief Justice of India & Hon’ble Judges, SUP. CT. INDIA, http://
supremecourtofindia.nic.in/judges/judges.htm [https://perma.cc/37D8-SBPC] (last visited Apr.
15, 2016).
110. See U.S. Appeals Courts Database, supra note 103.
111. See id. (noting the paucity of studies in this area prior to the creation of the source).
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the courts of appeals, much of which makes use of the Songer
database.112
While we are on the topic of data, I should also note that advances
in strategies and tools for analyzing data also have added power to
research on judging. Improvements have come about, in part, be-
cause specialists in methodology with an interest in law realized
that the unique sorts of data that scholars have amassed on courts
and judges can be useful for the development, adaptation, and as-
sessment of innovative analytic strategies. Examples in the past few
decades include, but are certainly not limited to, matching meth-
ods,113 network analysis,114 and measurement115 and event count
models.116
112. See, e.g., Deborah Beim et al., Signaling and Counter-Signaling in the Judicial
Hierarchy: An Empirical Analysis of En Banc Review, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 490, 491, 508 (2016);
Andreas Broscheid, Comparing Circuits: Are Some U.S. Courts of Appeals More Liberal or
Conservative than Others?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 171 (2011); Robert K. Christensen & John
Szmer, Examining the Efficiency of the U.S. Courts of Appeals: Pathologies and Prescriptions,
32 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 30, 30 (2012). 
113. See, e.g., RYAN C. BLACK & RYAN J. OWENS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT: EXECUTIVE BRANCH INFLUENCE AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS (2012). For
a review, see Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court During Crisis: How War Affects Only
Non-War Cases, 80 N.Y.U.  L. REV. 1 (2005); Daniel E. Ho & Donald B. Rubin, Credible Causal
Inference for Empirical Legal Studies, 7 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 17 (2011); Maya Sen, Is
Justice Really Blind? Race and Reversal in US Courts, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. S187 (2015).
114. See, e.g., Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier et al., Quality over Quantity: Amici Influence and
Judicial Decision Making, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 446 (2013); James H. Fowler & Sangick
Jeon, The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent, 30 SOC. NETWORKS 16 (2008); James H.
Fowler et al., Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal Importance of Precedents
at the U.S. Supreme Court, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 324 (2007); Yonatan Lupu & Erik Voeten,
Precedent in International Courts: A Network Analysis of Case Citations by the European
Court of Human Rights, 42 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 413 (2012).
115. See, e.g., Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 69 (2010) [hereinafter Ho & Quinn, A Switch in Time]; Andrew D. Martin &
Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S.
Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002). See generally Daniel E. Ho & Kevin
M. Quinn, How Not to Lie with Judicial Votes: Misconceptions, Measurement, and Models, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 813 (2010) [hereinafter Ho & Quinn, How Not to Lie].
116. See, e.g., Tom S. Clark, The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legit-
imacy, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 971 (2009); James F. Spriggs, II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Calling It
Quits: Strategic Retirement on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1893-1991, 48 POL. RES. Q. 573
(1995); see also THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT ON
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (2006).
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D. Why All the Attention?
In addition to improvements in data, the number of substantive
topics under investigation has exploded, so much so that I devote
Part II to this development. But let me pause for a moment and ask,
why all the attention to judicial behavior? Landes, Posner, and I
suggest one answer: the growing realization that law students, law-
yers, law professors, and even judges would better advance their
own career objectives by understanding the behavior of judges.117
I am sure there are other reasons, too—from the revolution in
microcomputing to the decades-old push for interprofessionality and
interdiscplinarity in many academic organizations. But at a meta-
level, I cannot help thinking that the study of judicial behavior is a
manifestation of the importance—perhaps growing importance—of
judges worldwide. Some of this stems from the fact that more courts
than ever have the power to invalidate government acts118 and, oc-
casionally, are not timid about using it to do very big things. The
Constitutional Court of South Africa held the death penalty un-
constitutional,119 and the German Constitutional Court held that
refusing to appoint Muslim female school teachers who wear head
scarves infringes on teachers’ rights to equal access to public of-
fice.120 Along somewhat different lines, Laurence Helfer and Erik
Voeten show how the European Court of Human Rights convinced
national governments (and courts) to become more progressive in
their treatment of LGBT rights issues, even though their decisions
are formally binding on only the parties to the dispute.121
But we do not have to travel to Johannesburg, Karlsruhe, or
Strasbourg for examples. Before the U.S. Supreme Court took up
the subject of same-sex marriage in 2015, thirty-seven states al-
ready had banned it.122 But in only eleven states did the people or
117. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 5-6; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS:
THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY (2016).
118. See Ginsburg & Versteeg, supra note 75, at 589-90.
119. See State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.).
120. See BVerfG, 2 BvR 1436/02, Sept. 24, 2003, http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20030924_2bvr
143602en.html [https://perma.cc/U5RP-45TH] (English translation).
121. See Laurence R. Helfer & Erik Voeten, International Courts as Agents of Legal
Change: Evidence from LGBT Rights in Europe, 68 INT’L ORG. 77, 89-90 (2014).
122. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2615 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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their representatives vote for same-sex marriage.123 In the rest, jud-
ges voted for it.124 And, of course, the Supreme Court dealt the final
blow when it held that the remaining bans violated guarantees of
due process and equal protection.125
It is not only in sociocultural matters where courts are important
players. Klerman and Mahoney were right when they linked judicial
independence and economic prosperity.126 Or at least the IMF and
World Bank seem to think Klerman and Mahoney got it right.127
These organizations have invested millions, perhaps billions, in le-
gal systems throughout the world, with an emphasis on improving
efficiency, access, independence, public trust, and implementation
of judicial decisions128—all in an effort to encourage economic
growth and investment.
II. SUBSTANTIVE AREAS OF INTEREST
I have identified a number of important ways in which the field
has changed since Pritchett’s day. One that I have not discussed but
have telegraphed throughout is the increase in the number of sub-
stantive topics now under study. In addition to the judge, which was
Pritchett’s interest, I count at least ten; and I doubt my list is in-
clusive.129 I describe these topics briefly in Part II.B.
In what directly follows, I focus on a subject that is not new: the
individual judge. I do so because it remains a primitive in the study
of judicial behavior and because even this “old” topic has advanced
in exciting and new ways, moving well beyond Pritchett’s emphasis
on the role of ideology in the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2604-05.
126. See Klerman & Mahoney, supra note 41, at 25.
127. See, e.g., Justice Sector Institutional Strengthening Project, WORLD BANK, http://www.
worldbank.org/projects/P143274/justice-sector-institutional-strengthening-project?lang=en
[https://perma.cc/4TV2-CFDV] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016). As do many economists. See, e.g.,
La Porta et al., supra note 43, at 468-69. As a political scientist, I am not yet convinced.
Helmke’s study, supra note 63, along with many others, tells us that there are limits to what
courts can accomplish when they are out of line with political elites, even when they seem to
have some degree of independence. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2008).
128. See, e.g., Justice Sector Institutional Strengthening Project, supra note 127.
129. See infra Part II.B.
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A. The Judge: Motivations, Careers, and Performance
Pritchett analyzed “The Judge”—or, in his case, “The Justice”—
and this remains a focus of study. In fact, I think of my book with
Posner and Landes as very much a story about the individual
judge.130 In it we present and test a realist model of judging that
views the judge as a participant in a labor market—the judicial
labor market.131 A judge so viewed, we argue, is motivated and
constrained as other workers are: by personal and institutional con-
cerns, by costs and benefits, by expectations, and by the tools and
methods of the job.132
We lay out a judicial utility function that reflects these ideas, but
to me it boils down to this: we think about judges as judges who are
bound by certain rules and norms,133 but also as people with profes-
sional and personal goals that they seek to maximize.
What are judges’ goals? Pritchett emphasized the policy goal, or
the idea that judges want to bring the law in line with their own
policy or ideological values.134 And Landes, Posner, and I find a good
deal of evidence to support Pritchett’s ideas among contemporary
judges and justices.135 No matter how we measure it, ideology plays
a role in judicial decisions. 
Figure 2 provides a very simple example for the U.S. Supreme
Court. It shows voting in favor of business, in favor of the govern-
ment (in criminal cases), and in opposition to the civil rights
claimant—in other words, it depicts the percentage of conservative
decisions. The dark gray bars are Roberts Court Justices appointed
by Democratic Presidents (Clinton and Obama), and the lighter bars
130. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7.
131. See id. at ch. 1.
132. See id.
133. I do not dwell in this Article on legal factors, motivations, or considerations. Instead
I will simply reiterate what Knight and I have said elsewhere: rather than perpetuate the
counterproductive, and unrealistic, legalism-versus-realism distinction by treating law as a
constraint or as a choice grounded in personal motivation, we should think about the desire
to “follow the law” as a factor motivating judges. Epstein & Knight, supra note 23, at 25.
134. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text; see also JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD
J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
135. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 66. The political science literature tends to treat
political goals, policy goals, ideological goals, and partisan goals as interchangeable. That is
in part because political scientists use partisan measures and ideological measures. See infra
notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
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are Roberts Court Justices appointed by Republican Presidents
(Ford, Reagan, Bush I, and Bush II). In each of the three areas, the
Republican appointees were significantly more conservative than
the Democratic appointees. These same basic patterns, it is worth
adding, hold for every issue area going back to 1937, the last Term
in our dataset.136
What is more, the Justices of our Supreme Court are not unique.
From Gunnar Grendstad et al.’s study, we learn that Norwegian
Supreme Court justices appointed by social democratic governments
are significantly more likely to find for the litigant pursuing a
“public economic interest” than are their nonsocialist counter-
parts.137 Ideology (as measured by the appointing regime) plays a
bigger role in these decisions than most any other factor that
Grendstad et al. considered. Christoph Hönnige found that ideology
helps predict the votes of judges serving on the French and German
Supreme Courts.138 And, in their study of Spanish Constitutional
Court judges, Nuno Garoupa et al. discovered that under certain
conditions, “[t]he personal ideology of the judges does matter,”
which led them to “reject the formalist approach taken by tradi-
tional constitutional law scholars in Spain.”139 Matias Iaryczower
and Gabriel Katz found that ideology plays a role on the British
Appellate Committee, though their account is more nuanced.140 Ide-
ology, they show, establishes “an informational hurdle for judges to
rule in a certain direction.”141 A judge leaning liberal (or conserva-
tive) “will vote against his bias if the information based on the facts
and on how the law applies to the case under consideration sur-
passes the threshold imposed by his preferences.”142
136. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 112.
137. GRENDSTAD ET AL., supra note 73.
138. Christoph Hönnige, The Electoral Connection: How the Pivotal Judge Affects Opposi-
tional Success at European Constitutional Courts, 32 W. EUR. POL. 963, 979-80 (2009); see also
Chris Hanretty, Dissent in Iberia: The Ideal Points of Justices on the Spanish and Portuguese
Constitutional Tribunals, 51 EUR. J. POL. RES. 671 (2012) (studying constitutional judges in
Spain and Portugal).
139. Nuno Garoupa et al., Judging Under Political Pressure: An Empirical Analysis of
Constitutional Review Voting in the Spanish Constitutional Court, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 513,
516 (2013).
140. See generally Matias Iaryczower & Gabriel Katz, More than Politics: Ability and Ideol-
ogy in the British Appellate Committee, 32 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 61 (2016).
141. Id. at 3.
142. Id.
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Figure 2. Votes by Justices During the Roberts Court Years,
Broken Down by the Party of the Appointing President
Notes:
(1) Includes twelve Justices serving during the Roberts Court.
(2) All differences between Republican and Democratic appointees are statistically significant
at p < 0.01.
(3) Business: Percent support for business. Data are from Epstein, Landes, and Posner for the
2005-2011 Terms (1173 total votes).143
(4) Civil Rights: Percent opposing civil rights claimants (except in affirmative action cases).
Calculated from the Supreme Court Database, using all orally argued cases for the 2005-2014
terms (1713 total votes).144
(5) Criminal Procedure: Percent support for the government. Calculated from the Supreme
Court Database, using all orally argued cases for the 2005-2014 Terms (1009 total votes).145
Because “ideology does not appear to be [a] uniquely American
phenomenon,”146 there is a virtual cottage industry devoted to mea-
suring the underlying ideological preferences of judges.147 Some
143. Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431,
1434-37 (2013).
144. See SUP. CT. DATABASE, supra note 101.
145. Id.
146. GRENDSTAD ET AL., supra note 73, at 146. 
147. On measures of judicial ideology in general, see Lee Epstein et al., Ideology and the
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measures are exogenous, meaning that they are based on informa-
tion that is causally prior to any vote cast by the judge. Especially
prevalent is the judges’ or the appointing authority’s party affilia-
tion, as you can tell from some of the studies I just discussed.148
There are also endogenous measures, which rely on revealed behav-
ior (usually votes or voting patterns) to measure ideology.149 Both
have their uses depending on the project.
At the same time, the studies, especially Iaryczower and Katz’s,150
demonstrate that ideological (or partisan) motivations have their
limits—and not only for judges outside the United States. As Figure
2 shows, there is hardly a perfect correlation between ideology and
voting: Far short of 0 percent of the votes cast by Democratic ap-
pointees were against business; and far short of 100 percent of the
Republican votes were in support of business. Moreover, once we
move down the judicial hierarchy to the U.S. courts of appeals and
district courts, ideology carries even less weight.151
To me, the upshot is this: however useful ideology is for under-
standing judicial behavior, it cannot be the only motivation or
explanation of judicial behavior (it may not even be especially
Study of Judicial Behavior, in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW 705 (Jon Hanson ed., 2012);
Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and How Should We Measure
It?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133 (2009); Ho & Quinn, How Not to Lie, supra note 115.
148. Other examples are the Segal-Cover scores, which are based on an analysis of
editorials published before the Justice is confirmed. Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideo-
logical Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 559
(1989). For scores based on the ideology of the home-state senator or appointing president, see
Micheal W. Giles et al., Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection
Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623 (2001), and Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007).
149. The most prominent of these are the Martin-Quinn scores. See Martin & Quinn, supra
note 115; see also Jason H. Windett et al., Estimating Dynamic Ideal Points for State Supreme
Courts, 23 POL. ANALYSIS 461 (2015).
150. See Iaryczower & Katz, supra note 140.
151. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at ch. 5. There are exceptions. See, e.g., Mark Jona-
than McKenzie, The Influence of Partisanship, Ideology, and the Law on Redistricting
Decisions in the Federal Courts, 65 POL. RES. Q. 799, 808-09 (2012) (showing that, in redist-
ricting cases, when precedent is ambiguous, “partisan favoritism ... operates as a significant
and strong influence that could overshadow ideological impulses” among federal judges);
Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”? An Empirical Study of Estab-
lishment Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1205 (2012) (arguing
that no variable other than ideology “proved consistently salient in predicting the outcome”
of religious establishment cases in the federal district courts and courts of appeals); see also
SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 106 (noting exceptions in certain areas of the law).
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weighty for many judges).152 For this reason, contemporary studies
have offered (or found evidence consistent with) some twenty-odd
goals, motives, and preferences, ranging from “reasoning utility”153
to discretion154 to income,155 in addition to legal and ideological con-
siderations.
Attending to all these goals would undermine the project of devel-
oping a more realistic conception of judicial behavior; it would de-
volve into a “what-the-judge-ate-for-breakfast” account.156 More to
the point, it is possible to construct a more realistic conception of
judicial motivation that expands the set of relevant motivations
while continuing to facilitate the pursuit of general explanations of
judicial decision making.
As I mentioned earlier, Landes, Posner, and I make such an effort
by introducing the importance of personal motivations for judicial
choice, without downgrading the political scientists’ emphasis on
152. I adopt some of this discussion from Epstein & Knight, supra note 23, at 25.
153. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process, 51 SMU L.
REV. 469, 474 (1998); see also Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and
Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1053-54
(1995).
154. See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior or What’s “Unconstitutional”
About the Sentencing Commission?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 183, 186-87 (1991); Richard S. Hig-
gins & Paul H. Rubin, Judicial Discretion, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 129 (1980); Jonathan R. Macey,
Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627 (1994).
155. See, e.g., Gary M. Anderson et al., On the Incentives of Judges to Enforce Legislative
Wealth Transfers, 32 J.L. & ECON. 215 (1989). See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997) [hereinafter BAUM, PUZZLE].
For other goals, see LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006); DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF
APPEALS (2002); Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The
Same Way Everyone Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions,
51 EMORY L.J. 83 (2002); Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private and Public Judges, 41
PUB. CHOICE 107 (1983); Mitu Gulati & C.M.A McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 157 (1998); David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Ex-
planation of Lower Court Compliance, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 579 (2003); Thomas J. Miceli &
Metin M. Cosgel, Reputation and Judicial Decision-Making, 23 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 31
(1994); Posner, supra note 55; Salzberger & Fenn, supra note 72; Frederick Schauer, Incen-
tives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615
(2000); Joanna Shepherd, Measuring Maximizing Judges: Empirical Legal Studies, Public
Choice Theory, and Judicial Behavior, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1753; Douglas Glen Whitman,
Evolution of the Common Law and the Emergence of Compromise, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 753
(2000).
156. But see Danziger et al., supra note 94.
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ideology or the law community’s interest in legal motivations.157 We
argue that given time constraints, judges seek to maximize their
preferences over a set of roughly five personal factors (most of which
also have implications for ideological and legal goals158): job satis-
faction,159 external satisfactions,160 leisure,161 salary/income,162 and
promotion.163
157. See generally EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7.
158. Knight and I explored these in some detail in Epstein & Knight, supra note 23, at 19-
24.
159. I take job satisfaction to mean “the internal satisfaction of feeling that one is doing a
good job,” as well as the more social dimensions of judicial work, such as relations with other
judges, clerks, and staff. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 48; see also BAUM, PUZZLE, supra
note 155, at 42-47; Greg A. Caldeira, The Incentives of Trial Judges and the Administration
of Justice, 3 JUST. SYS. J. 163, 163-64 (1977); Drahozal, supra note 153, at 476; Gulati &
McCauliff, supra note 155, at 165; Shapiro & Levy, supra note 153, at 1055-56.
160. Many studies emphasize the “external satisfactions [that come] from being a judge,
including reputation, prestige, power, influence, and celebrity.” EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7,
at 48; see, e.g., Drahozal, supra note 153, at 475; Miceli & Cosgel, supra note 155, at 31-33;
Schauer, supra note 155, at 7; Shapiro & Levy, supra note 153, at 1055-56; Whitman, supra
note 155, at 753.
161. A preference for leisure plays almost no role in the political science literature, but see
Klein & Hume, supra note 155, at 602, but it comes to the fore in many economic analyses of
judging. See, e.g., Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 155, at 105-06; Drahozal, supra note 153,
at 475-76; Posner, supra note 55, at 1-2. The basic idea is that, again like all of us, judges
value leisure and, “[a]t some point, the opportunity cost of foregone leisure exceeds the bene-
fits to the judge of additional time spent making decisions.” Drahozal, supra note 153, at 476.
If so, we would expect judges to engage in behaviors designed to increase or at least protect
their leisure time. Id.
162. Holding all else equal, judges prefer more salary, income, and personal comfort to
less—as do most of us. See BAUM, PUZZLE, supra note 155, at 44. The empirical literature
provides some evidence that they attempt to maximize these goals by acting in ways
consistent with the preferences of their “bosses”—of which the legislature is certainly one. Id.
at 42-44. Because elected representatives control raises, court budgets (and thus, for example,
can augment or reduce the number of staff), and pension plans, it is not surprising to find
some deference to their preferences. See, e.g., Mario Bergara et al., Modeling Supreme Court
Strategic Decision Making: The Congressional Constraint, 28 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 247, 247-48
(2003); Anna Harvey & Barry Friedman, Pulling Punches: Congressional Constraints on the
Supreme Court’s Constitutional Rulings, 1987-2000, 31 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 533, 535-36 (2006);
Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Congress, the Supreme Court, and Judicial Review: Testing a Consti-
tutional Separation of Powers Model, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 89, 91-93 (2011). But the mechanism
is not always clear. It could be that deference is primarily a function of the legislature’s power
to hold salaries constant or impose other pecuniary sanctions (or rewards), or it could be that
the judges are responding to a multitude of other weapons at the legislature’s disposal. For
a list, see Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power, 54
REV. POL. 369, 376-77 (1992).
163. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 48.
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To give you a flavor of the analysis, let me focus on the last moti-
vation: promotion. This would seem to be an important factor influ-
encing the personal utility that judges gain from their work.164 It
could be coincident with policy preferences: the higher judges sit in
the hierarchy, the more important the cases they hear and the
greater the opportunity to influence the law. Promotion also tends
to increase job satisfaction, prestige and reputation, and, of course,
salary.165
To explore the possible effects of this motivation, Landes, Posner,
and I compare federal judges with some realistic possibility of pro-
motion with those without much hope of promotion to determine
whether the former “audition” for their next job.166 We hypothesized
that these auditioners would impose harsher sentences on criminal
defendants to avoid being tagged as soft on crime.167 The data sup-
ported this hypothesis.168
But our results, I think, do more than flesh out a particular ele-
ment in the judge’s personal utility function. They, along with the
many other studies I cite in the notes, pose a serious challenge to
the standard political science line that judges are driven largely, if
not exclusively, by ideology—or what Jack Knight and I have called
an “(un)realist(ic) conception of judicial behavior.”169
Posing a challenge of a different sort are the many studies assess-
ing the extent to which the judges’ attributes and backgrounds
164. See id.
165. Id. at 35-36.
166. Id. at 341. We were hardly the first to explore promotion effects. See, e.g., Mark A.
Cohen, The Motives of Judges: Empirical Evidence from Antitrust Sentencing, 12 INT’L REV.
L. & ECON. 13, 27 (1992) (finding that judges with promotion potential give higher antitrust
fines); S. Scott Gaille, Publishing by United States Court of Appeals Judges: Before and After
the Bork Hearings, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 372-75 (1997) (finding that the number of articles
published by court of appeals judges standing some chance of elevation to the Supreme Court
dropped “precipitously” after the Bork hearings); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the
Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1377, 1487-93 (1998) (showing that district court judges with a higher chance of promotion
are more likely to uphold the politically popular federal sentencing guidelines); Ahmed E.
Taha, Publish or Paris? Evidence of How Judges Allocate Their Time, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
1, 21-23 (2004) (same). On promotion effects in courts abroad, see Ramseyer & Rasmusen,
Japanese Judges, supra note 87 (discussing promotion of judges in Japanese courts); Salz-
berger & Fenn, supra note 72 (studying promotion of judges in the English Court of Appeals).
167. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 359.
168. Id. at 376-79.
169. Epstein & Knight, supra note 23, at 13.
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affect their choices.170 Some focus on the judges’ career experi-
ences—for example, do judges who come to the bench from another
judicial post make different choices than those who come from the
private sector or another public-sector job?171 Are former prosecutors
tougher on defendants?172 There is also a growing-by-the-day liter-
ature on the effect of race and ethnicity on judging—whether on the
litigants, the judges, or both.173
I am especially interested in the effect of gender, perhaps because
of the extraordinary growth in the fraction of female judges over the
course of my career—from well under 10 percent of federal judges
to a third by 2015.174
170. The study of judges’ backgrounds has a long pedigree in the literature on judicial
behavior tracing back to at least Sheldon Goldman’s seminal study, Voting Behavior on the
United States Courts of Appeals, 1961-1964, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 374 (1966). See also
Michael W. Giles & Thomas G. Walker, Judicial Policy-Making and Southern School Segre-
gation, 37 J. POL. 917, 929 (1975) (finding that whether a judge went to school in the South
or not helps explain the policy choices made by southern federal judges in race relations
cases).
171. See, e.g., James J. Brudeny et al., Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying
the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675, 1682 (1999);
Daniel M. Schneider, Empirical Research on Judicial Reasoning: Statutory Interpretation in
Federal Tax Cases, 31 N.M. L. REV. 325, 349 (2001).
172. See, e.g., Stuart S. Nagel, Judicial Background and Criminal Cases, 53 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 333 (1962). We review much of this literature in Lee Epstein et
al., The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its Consequences for Career Diversity on the
U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 903, 961-65 (2003). For examples of studies published
subsequent to ours, see Luciano Da Ros, Judges in the Formation of the Nation-State: Profes-
sional Experiences, Academic Background and Geographic Circulation of Members of the
Supreme Courts of Brazil and the United States, 4 BRAZILIAN POL. SCI. REV. 102 (2010), http://
socialsciences.scielo.org/pdf/s_bpsr/v5nse/scs_a04.pdf [https://perma.cc/69GW-EJY3]; Tracey
E. George & Margaret S. Williams, Venue Shopping: The Judges of the U.S. Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation, 97 JUDICATURE 196, 196-97 (2014); Daniel M. Schneider, Using
the Social Background Model to Explain Who Wins Federal Appellate Tax Decisions: Do Less
Traditional Judges Favor the Taxpayer?, 25 VA. TAX REV. 201 (2005).
173. Some relatively recent examples include David Abrams et al., Do Judges Vary in Their
Treatment of Race?, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 347 (2012); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging
the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2008); Jonathan P. Kastellec, Racial Diversity
and Judicial Influence on Appellate Courts, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 167 (2013); Jason L. Morin,
The Voting Behavior of Minority Judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: Does the Race of the
Claimant Matter?, 42 AM. POL. RES. 34 (2014); Cassia Spohn, The Effects of the Offender’s
Race, Ethnicity, and Sex on Federal Sentencing Outcomes in the Guidelines Era, 76 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 75 (2013).
174. According to the Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, of the 791 active judges
sitting on the U.S. Supreme Court, the courts of appeals, and the district courts in November
2015, 266 are female. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUD. CTR., http://
www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html [https://perma.cc/5QVW-3BRA] (last visited
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Naturally enough, this development has led many scholars to ask:
Do female judges decide cases differently than male judges?175
Christina Boyd, Andrew Martin, and I took our own stab at
answering this question by using a matching method to compare the
votes of male and female judges in thirteen areas of the law.176 We
found no difference in twelve of the areas; the exception was gender-
based employment discrimination.177 In these cases, the female
judges were 12 percentage points more likely than males to favor
the party bringing suit—a significant and substantial difference.178
So, almost needless to write, work on the individual judge goes
on, but it has taken some interesting turns since Pritchett. I have
emphasized explanations for the judicial vote other than partisan-
ship and ideology. But there are at least two other developments
that deserve mention. First, studies are now moving beyond the vote
with the goal of analyzing the many other choices judges make—for
example, whether to recuse,179 whether to encourage settlement,180
how to approach oral argument,181 how to write (efficacious) opin-
ions,182 to whom to assign the opinion of the court and the impor-
Apr. 15, 2016).
175. See Boyd, Epstein & Martin, supra note 106, at 390-92 (reviewing existing literature
on this issue).
176. Id. at 389.
177. Id. at 406.
178. Id. Why the difference? We think it likely has to do with priors. Having likely experi-
enced employment discrimination themselves, the females start with higher priors about the
plaintiff ’s believability. We are exploring this and other possible explanations in a follow-up
study. 
179. See, e.g., Robert J. Hume, Deciding Not to Decide: The Politics of Recusals on the U.S.
Supreme Court, 48 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 621 (2014).
180. See, e.g., Christina L. Boyd, She’ll Settle It?, 1 J.L. & CTS. 193 (2013).
181. See, e.g., RYAN C. BLACK ET AL., ORAL ARGUMENTS AND COALITION FORMATION ON THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT: A DELIBERATE DIALOGUE (2012); LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, ORAL
ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT (2008); Lee Epstein et al., Inferring the Winning
Party in the Supreme Court from the Pattern of Questioning at Oral Argument, 39 J. LEGAL
STUD. 433 (2010); Timothy R. Johnson et al., Advice from the Bench (Memo): Clerk Influence
on Supreme Court Oral Arguments, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 21 (2014).
182. See, e.g., Susan B. Haire et al., Diversity, Deliberation, and Judicial Opinion Writing,
1 J.L. & CTS. 303 (2013); Rachael K. Hinkle et al., A Positive Theory and Empirical Analysis
of Strategic Word Choice in District Court Opinions, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 407 (2012); Ryan J.
Owens et al., How the Supreme Court Alters Opinion Language to Evade Congressional Re-
view, 1 J.L. & CTS. 35 (2013); Staton & Vanberg, supra note 19. 
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tance of that choice,183 and what precedents (and other authority) to
cite.184 (I have more to say about some of these in the next Section.)
Second and relatedly, there is a developing literature on judicial
service. Some studies assess judicial performance,185 and others fo-
cus on judges’ end-of-career decisions.186 Both topics are sufficiently
important to merit more sustained attention.
B. Other Topics and Research Questions
Work on the individual judge will continue; it is that essential to
the judicial behavior project. At the same time, there has been an
explosion of research on other topics. Below I very briefly reference
ten: (1) judicial independence and dependence, (2) judicial selection
and retention, (3) access to court, (4) opinions and precedent, (5) col-
legial courts, (6) the hierarchy of justice, (7) executives and legisla-
tures, (8) litigants, attorneys, and interest groups, (9) public opinion
and macroevents, and (10) implementation and efficacy of judicial
decisions.187
183. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Lax & Kelly Rader, Bargaining Power in the Supreme Court:
Evidence from Opinion Assignment and Vote Switching, 77 J. POL. 648 (2015).
184. See, e.g., Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, The Citation and Depreciation of U.S.
Supreme Court Precedent, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 325 (2013); Yonatan Lupu & James
H. Fowler, Strategic Citations to Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 151
(2013); Stephen A. Simon, The Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Rights
Cases: An Empirical Study, 1 J.L. & CTS. 279, 279-81 (2013).
185. See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 50, at 47-51; Elliot Ash & W. Bentley MacLeod, The
Performance of Elected Officials: Evidence from State Supreme Courts 1-4 (Sept. 11, 2015)
(unpublished paper), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/MacLeod_and_Ash_The_ Per-
formance_of_Elected_ Officials.pdf [https://perma.cc/USQ2-3KAA]; Tom S. Clark et al., Esti-
mating the Effect of Leisure on Judicial Performance 1-2 (Aug. 6, 2015) (unpublished paper),
http://www.tomclarkphd.com/workingpapers/LeisureAndEffort.pdf) [https://perma.cc/ PKH6-
P7U2].
186. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi et al., The Law and Policy of Judicial Retirement: An Em-
pirical Study, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 111 (2013); Tajuana Massie et al., The Politics of Judicial
Retirement in Canada and the United Kingdom, 2 J.L. & CTS. 273 (2014); Spriggs & Wahlbeck,
supra note 116, at 573-74.
187. I adapt some of the material to follow from my introductions to THE ECONOMICS OF
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOUR (L. Epstein ed., 2013) and COURTS AND JUDGES (L. Epstein ed., 2005).
In the former, I do not discuss all these topics; in the latter, I organize the discussion in a
different way, focusing on the selection and retention of judges, judicial decision making,
limitations on judicial power, and the role of courts in democracies.
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Before turning to these topics, three notes are in order. First, I
cannot do justice to any one of them.188 My goal is rather to supply
a bit of information on each if only to induce you to read more
deeply. The footnotes provide some pointers (though if I tried to cite
all the relevant studies, I would need an entire volume, maybe two,
of the William & Mary Law Review).
Second, it is highly unlikely that my list of ten is inclusive. In
fact, I know I exclude some topics on the ground that they do not fit
squarely in the area of judicial behavior. One example is the analy-
sis of clerks and other judicial staff. Although some of the studies
attempt to draw a connection between the actors and the choices
judges make,189 many of them are devoted to studying the actors
themselves.190
Finally, although I take each topic in turn, the ten (eleven if we
count “The Judge”) are far from mutually exclusive. This is entirely
evident from the material that follows, so let me provide just one
example—from Ramseyer and Rasmusen’s study on Japanese jud-
ges.191 Because the authors demonstrate that the judges’ careers
hinge on deference to the government,192 this work makes a contri-
bution to the literature on courts and elected officials. But it just as
easily fits into the literature on “The Judge” as it speaks to the
judges’ interest in promotion and other careerist motivations.193
188. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 89-99 (providing a reasonably comprehensive
bibliography of studies falling under some of the topics I discuss below). I therefore (mostly)
emphasize more recent ones in the footnotes to follow.
189. See, e.g., Ryan C. Black et al., Revisiting the Influence of Law Clerks on the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s Agenda-Setting Process, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 75, 76-79 (2014); Johnson et al., supra
note 181, at 22-25; Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Albert H. Yoon, Judicial Ghostwriting: Authorship
on the Supreme Court, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1307, 1308-13 (2011).
190. Another example is the role of courts in their societies. Although related to several of
the topics above (especially (1), (7), (9), and (10)), much of this literature focuses on the cir-
cumstances under which judges will invalidate government action on the ground that it
violates the Constitution and, so, relates directly to the study of judicial behavior. This litera-
ture, both in the United States and abroad, is so substantial and already the subject of good
reviews that I (mostly) set it aside in the material to follow.
191. Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Japanese Judges, supra note 87, at 331-32.
192. Id. at 334.
193. See id.
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1. Judicial Independence and Dependence
Studies focusing on judicial independence vary in their concerns.
Some attempt to define the term “judicial independence,” though
there now seems to be convergence on conceptualizing it as the abil-
ity of judges to behave sincerely, whatever their sincere preferences
may be and regardless of the preferences of other relevant actors,
without fear of reprisal and with some confidence that political ac-
tors will enforce their decisions.194 Other work has attempted to
develop and analyze measures of de jure (for example, a constitu-
tional guarantee of life tenure) or de facto (expert assessments, for
instance) judicial independence195 to understand why societies are
more or less prone to adopt institutions associated with judicial in-
dependence196 and to connect judicial independence to economic
prosperity and human rights.197
More relevant to the analysis of judicial behavior is research
testing the assumption that de jure guarantees of judicial inde-
pendence, in fact, lead to a more “independent” judiciary. Much of
this work explores the relationship (or lack thereof) between mea-
sures of de jure and de facto independence198—for example, is there
a connection between giving judges life tenure and experts rating
the judiciary as “independent”? Fewer studies consider the relation-
ship between de jure measures and actual judicial behavior (though
the literature I referenced earlier on judicial elections in the states
is an exception; more on this momentarily)—for example, is it the
case, as the economic literature assumes, that courts with de jure
194. See, e.g., Julio Ríos-Figueroa & Jeffrey K. Staton, An Evaluation of Cross-National
Measures of Judicial Independence, 30 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 104, 104-06 (2014).
195. See id. at 106-08. For a cross-national measure of de facto independence, see Drew A.
Linzer & Jeffrey K. Staton, A Global Measure of Judicial Independence, 1948-2012, 3 J.L. &
CTS. 223, 223-25 (2015).
196. See, e.g., TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 1-20 (2003); Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, Mapping Constitutionally
Safeguarded Judicial Independence—A Global Survey, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 159, 159-
61 (2014).
197. See, e.g., Linda Camp Keith, Judicial Independence and Human Rights Protection
Around the World, 85 JUDICATURE 195, 195-96 (2002); Klerman & Mahoney, supra note 41,
at 2-5; La Porta et al., supra note 43, at 446-49.
198. See, e.g., James Melton & Tom Ginsburg, Does De Jure Judicial Independence Really
Matter? A Reevaluation of Explanations for Judicial Independence, 2 J.L. & CTS. 187, 187-90
(2014); Ríos-Figueroa & Staton, supra note 194, at 106-08.
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independence are more likely to protect rights against government
interference in actual judicial decisions? Both lines of research are
equally interesting, but at this stage in the field’s development, I
would welcome more on the latter.
2. The Selection and Retention of Judges
Societies have composed an impressive array of institutions to
govern the selection and retention of judges—from life tenure, to a
single nonrenewable term, to periodic election and reelection by the
electorate.199 And a substantial body of work considers the decisions
of the actors who select (or retain) the judges—the President and
Senate for federal judges, and governors, legislatures, commissions,
and voters for state judges.200
The literature on judicial behavior is more concerned with
whether and how these various institutions affect the choices judges
make201—and so is related to the work on judicial independence. If
we define judicial independence as I have above, then we might ex-
pect that forcing judges to face the electorate or the legislature for
renewal—relative to providing them with life tenure—leads to a
more dependent judiciary because there are higher opportunity
costs for voting on the basis of their sincere preferences. On this
199. For a list of selection and retention systems in the United States, see Retention
Evaluation Programs, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., http://judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/
methods/judicial_performance_evaluations.cfm?state= [https://perma.cc/HR6Q-N69Q] (last
visited Apr. 15, 2016), and Selection of Judges, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., http://judicialselection.
us/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm?state= [https://perma.cc/RTZ8-4V4F]
(last visited Apr. 15, 2016). For systems used in Europe, see Lee Epstein & Jack Knight,
Courts and Judges, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 170, 178 (Austin
Sarat ed., 2004), and Epstein et al., supra note 61, at 11-15.
200. E.g., JAMES L. GIBSON, ELECTING JUDGES: THE SURPRISING EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGNING
ON JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY (2012); Charles M. Cameron et al., Senate Voting on Supreme Court
Nominees: A Neoinstitutional Model, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 525, 525-27 (1990); Chris Han-
retty, The Appointment of Judges by Ministers: Political Preferment in England, 1880-2005,
3 J.L. & CTS. 305, 305-07 (2015).
201. There is a related body of literature that looks at whether the rules governing the
appointment and retention of judges affect the types of people who are selected to serve as
judges. See, e.g., Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Explaining Judicial Diversity: The
Differential Ability of Women and Minorities to Attain Seats on State Supreme and Appellate
Courts, 3 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 329, 329-31 (2003); Margaret Williams, Women’s Representation
on State Trial and Appellate Courts, 88 SOC. SCI. Q. 1192, 1192-95 (2007).
2054 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:2017
theory, a life-tenured system should lead to a more independent ju-
diciary, with judges freer to vote as they desire.
There seems to be some truth to this. Recall Tabarrok and
Helland’s study (among many others), demonstrating that when jud-
ges in the United States know that they must face the electorate to
keep their jobs, the judges engage in sophisticated behavior, such as
ruling for in-state plaintiffs and against criminal defendants.202
These results are not surprising: when societies subject their
judges to reelection, they are presumably trying to induce account-
ability. But what of life-tenured judges? Oddly, research has shown
that U.S. Supreme Court Justices tend to vote as their appointing
President would—almost as if the President appointed himself to
the Court.203 Perhaps this recurring pattern reflects loyalty on the
part of life-tenured Justices,204 or perhaps life-tenured Justices feel
free to vote sincerely (without fear of reprisal) because they share
the preferences of the regime that appointed them.
And therein lies the rub for life-tenured schemes. Although they
are designed to induce judicial independence, once the appointing
regime changes, they can produce the opposite effect, or at least
cause institutional problems for the judges. There is some limited
evidence (not to mention famous anecdotes205) that as a life-tenured
Court ages, attacks from the elected branches follow, with the jud-
ges ultimately caving to the pressure.206 Seen in this way, nonrenew-
able terms, which are used in many European countries for their
constitutional court judges, may be a better mechanism than life
202. See Tabarrok & Helland, supra note 25, at 186-87.
203. See LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 135-41 (2005); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Buyer Beware? Presidential
Success Through Supreme Court Appointments, 53 POL. RES. Q. 557, 557-70 (2000).
204. Because Presidents cannot really retaliate against a particular Justice once the Jus-
tice is on the bench, I was surprised when Eric Posner and I found some evidence of a loyalty
effect. See Lee Epstein & Eric Posner, Supreme Court Justices’ Loyalty to the President (Dec.
10, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2702144 [https://perma.cc/JM8N-P5YV].
205. The battle between FDR and the Supreme Court is the most obvious example. For a
great empirical account, see Ho & Quinn, A Switch in Time, supra note 115.
206. See, e.g., Epstein et al., supra note 61, at 34-36.
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tenure for inducing judicial independence.207 But we need far more
work—necessarily comparative work—to get a better handle on this.
3. Access to Judicial Power
Accessing courts is another substantial area of study in the
judicial behavior literature, and it covers a lot of terrain. In past
decades, the emphasis was on agenda setting in apex courts—most-
ly on the Supreme Court’s decision to grant or deny certiorari. I
think here of Gregory Caldeira, John Wright, and Christopher
Zorn’s justifiably famous analysis of case selection in the Supreme
Court.208 They show that Justices are less likely to vote to grant
certiorari (that is, to agree to hear a case) when they think they will
be on the losing side of the case if certiorari is granted, even if they
would like to reverse the decision below (sometimes called a “defen-
sive denial”).209 Caldeira et al. also supply evidence of “aggressive
grants”: voting to hear a case when the Justice agrees with the low-
er court’s decision because he believes that the majority of the other
Justices do too.210 This sort of strategic behavior may be contribut-
ing to the noticeable decline in the Supreme Court’s plenary
docket.211
Work on certiorari is ongoing,212 but scholars also have turned
their attention to how courts interpret various threshold require-
ments.213 In one of the first systematic studies,214 C. K. Rowland and
207. See id. at 33-34. Had some version of nonrenewable terms been in effect—say one
creating a tenure of nine years—only three of the Justices serving on the 1935-1937 Court
would have been on the bench: Hughes (appointed Chief Justice in 1930); Owen J. Roberts
(1930); and Benjamin Cardozo (1932). See id. at 34.
208. Gregory A. Caldeira, John R. Wright & Christopher J.W. Zorn, Sophisticated Voting
and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549 (1999).
209. See id. at 556-58.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 570.
212. See, e.g., FLEMMING, supra note 98, at 1-3; Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Agenda
Setting in the Supreme Court: The Collision of Policy and Jurisprudence, 71 J. POL. 1062
(2009).
213. See, e.g., Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing
Doctrine? An Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921-2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591
(2010); Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612 (2004).
214. Other early work includes Gregory J. Rathjen & Harold J. Spaeth, Access to the Fed-
eral Courts: An Analysis of Burger Court Policy Making, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 360 (1979), and
Gregory J. Rathjen & Harold J. Spaeth, Denial of Access and Ideological Preferences: An
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Bridget Todd found that Reagan appointees to the U.S. district
courts were more likely to grant standing to “upperdog” litigants,
relative to Nixon, Ford, and Carter appointees.215 Also, following
from the late, great William H. Riker’s work on the “art of manipula-
tion,”216 studies have explored whether and to what extent judges
raise questions about standing, mootness, and the like to turn
around a seemingly foregone loss.217
Finally, I would include in this category research on how judges
use various procedures to kick or keep cases on the docket. The
Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly218 and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal219 (“Twiqbal”), which made it easier for district
courts to dismiss cases before any pretrial discovery, have led to a
virtual cottage industry of studies assessing the impact of these de-
cisions on lawyers and lower courts.220 Depending on the case, the
design, the data, and so on, studies have reached different conclu-
sions. In a particularly smart article, William Hubbard finds that
“Twombly precipitated no significant change in dismissal rates,
even after accounting for selection effects.”221 Our analysis con-
cluded much the same about Twombly, but not so of Iqbal. In the
post-Iqbal period (June 2009 to June 2010), the predicted probabil-
Analysis of the Voting Behavior of the Burger Court Justices, 1969-1976, 36 W. POL. Q. 71
(1983).
215. See C.K. Rowland & Bridget Jeffery Todd, Where You Stand Depends on Who Sits:
Platform Promises and Judicial Gatekeeping in the Federal District Courts, 53 J. POL. 175,
180-82 (1991). More recent studies include FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S.
COURTS OF APPEALS 1-2, 178-79 (2007), and Erin B. Kaheny, The Nature of Circuit Court Gate-
keeping Decisions, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 129 (2010).
216. E.g., WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION, at ix-xi (1986); William
H. Riker, The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787, with Comments
on Determinism and Rational Choice, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 14-15 (1984).
217. See, e.g., Ryan C. Black et al., Trying to Get What You Want: Heresthetical Maneuver-
ing and U.S. Supreme Court Decision Making, 66 POL. RES. Q. 819, 819 (2013); Lee Epstein
& Olga Shvetsova, Heresthetical Maneuvering on the US Supreme Court, 14 J. THEORETICAL
POL. 93, 95-97 (2002); Greg Goelzhauser, Avoiding Constitutional Cases, 39 AM. POL. RES. 483,
483 (2011).
218. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
219. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
220. For a review of the “[s]ome twenty published and unpublished studies [offering] sys-
tematic empirical analysis of Twiqbal’s impact,” see David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal
Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1204 n.7 (2013).
221. William H.J. Hubbard, Testing for Change in Procedural Standards, with Application
to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 35 (2013). 
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ity of dismissal increased by somewhere between 35 and 49 percent
relative to their pre-Iqbal levels.222
4. Opinions and Precedent
In the course of deciding cases, judges face countless choices, in-
cluding, in many societies, whether to join the majority or write
separately, and then how to craft their opinions. A substantial liter-
ature addresses these choices. For example, Landes, Posner, and I
take up the puzzle of why judges sometimes do not dissent when
they disagree with the majority.223 Our basic argument is that dis-
sents impose substantial collegiality costs on the other judges on the
panel by making them work harder (for example, increasing the
length of majority opinions), while the benefits of dissenting (such
as future citations) are few.224 Although “dissent aversion” is strong-
er in the U.S. circuit courts (and in many courts abroad) than in the
U.S. Supreme Court, some evidence suggests that it exists there too,
especially in cases in which the ideological stakes are low, for even
in the Court, dissents can be the source of workplace irritation.225
Virginia Hettinger, Stefanie Lindquist, and Wendy Martinek consid-
er dissent from a different angle, asking whether purely ideological
or strategic accounts best explain a judge’s decision to join the
majority.226 Their answer? Ideological accounts.227
Other studies are trained on majority opinions and consider how
they make use of precedent and other materials (legal or otherwise).
I have already mentioned work addressing whether and why lower
court judges follow precedent established by higher courts.228 A
222. See Lee Epstein et al., Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101 (2011).
223. See id. at 101.
224. See id. at 102-03. But see Deborah Beim & Jonathan P. Kastellec, The Interplay of
Ideological Diversity, Dissents, and Discretionary Review in the Judicial Hierarchy: Evidence
from Death Penalty Cases, 76 J. POL. 1074, 1074 (2014) (arguing that dissenting has more
benefits, and explaining that “this rarity of dissent means they are informative: when judges
do dissent, they influence en banc review in a manner consistent with the preferences of full
circuits”).
225. See Epstein et al., supra note 222, at 118-20.
226. Virginia A. Hettinger et al., Comparing Attitudinal and Strategic Accounts of
Dissenting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 123, 123-24 (2004). 
227. See id. at 123.
228. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
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fascinating literature also details how judges develop their argu-
ments and choose which materials to cite (or “borrow”), including
internal precedent,229 lower court opinions,230 foreign law,231 legal
and nonlegal information from briefs,232 and “originalist” sources.233
Work using plagiarism software to compare the parties’ briefs and
the Justices’ opinions too has been quite eye-opening.234
Jeffrey Staton and Georg Vanberg also analyze opinions, but
they are less concerned with the sources the judges use than with
the way the judges write them.235 They want to know why judges
sometimes write vague opinions when the judges could be more
decisive.236 The result they derive is interesting: assuming the costs
to implementers of deviating from a clear court decision are higher
than the costs of deviating from a vague decision (because noncom-
pliance is easier to detect), then a court facing “friendly” implement-
ers will write clear opinions.237 Clarity increases pressure for—and
229. See, e.g., Black & Spriggs, supra note 184, at 327-28 (2013); Lupu & Fowler,
supra note 184, at 152-53.
230. See, e.g., Pamela C. Corley et al., Lower Court Influence on U.S. Supreme Court
Opinion Content, 73 J. POL. 31 (2011).
231. See, e.g., Stephen A. Simon, The Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional
Rights Cases: An Empirical Study, 1 J.L. & CTS. 279, 280-81 (2013). 
232. See, e.g., Paul M. Collins, Jr. et al., The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on U.S.
Supreme Court Opinion Content, 49 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 917, 917 (2015); Pamela C. Corley, The
Supreme Court and Opinion Content: The Influence of Parties’ Briefs, 61 POL. RES. Q. 468, 477
(2008).
233. See, e.g., Pamela C. Corley et al., The Supreme Court and Opinion Content: The Use
of the Federalist Papers, 58 POL. RES. Q. 329, 329-30 (2005); Melvyn R. Durchslag, The Su-
preme Court and the Federalist Papers: Is There Less Here than Meets the Eye?, 14 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 243, 247 (2005); Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An Original Look
at Originalism, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 113, 113 (2002).
234. E.g., Adam Feldman, A Brief Assessment of Supreme Court Opinion Language, 1946-
2013, MISS. L.J. (forthcoming), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract=2574451
[https://perma.cc/WG66-9HER]. This paper received write-ups in the New York Times and the
ABA Journal, among other outlets. See Adam Liptak, Clarence Thomas, a Supreme Court
Justice of Few Words, Some Not His Own, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/08/28/us/justice-clarence-thomas-rulings-studies.html [https://perma.cc/3PT4-S8L6];
Debra Cassens Weiss, Which SCOTUS Justices Crib the Most from Briefs?, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 28,
2015, 9:36 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/which_scotus_justices_crib_ the_
most_from_briefs [https://perma.cc/ZM8F-F4NU].
235. See Staton & Vanberg, supra note 19, at 504.
236. Id.
237. See id. at 507.
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thus the likelihood of—compliance.238 But when the probability of
opposition from implementers is high, clarity could be costly to the
judges; if policymakers are determined to defy even a crystal clear
decision, they would highlight the relative lack of judicial power.239
To soften anticipated resistance, courts may be purposefully
vague.240
Staton and Vanberg provide several examples of their theory in
action,241 but more systematic follow-ups now exist. Ryan C. Black
et al., for example, use software called Linguistic Inquiry and Word
Count (LIWC) to show that Justices strategically craft language in
their opinions, adjusting the level of clarity to correspond to their
assessment of the likelihood of noncompliance by external actors,
including federal agencies and the states.242 Pamela Corley and
Justin Wedeking find that lower courts are more likely to follow
Supreme Court decisions that are written at higher degrees of cer-
tainty, with certainty also assessed using LIWC.243
5. Collegial Courts
A cottage industry of studies exists on the relations among judges
who serve on the same court. Many studies focus on so-called “pan-
el,” “collegial,” or “peer” effects, asking whether the case’s outcome
(or a judge’s vote) would have been different had a single judge, and
not a panel, decided the case244—and, if so, why? The foundational
work is Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller’s Judicial Partisanship and




241. Staton and Vanberg point to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in the school
desegregation case Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955), and the
German Constitutional Court’s rulings in two important taxation cases. See Staton &
Vanberg, supra note 19, at 504. In both, the Justices’ concerns about compliance and,
ultimately, legitimacy, led the courts to be ambiguous about the precise actions that would
be consistent with their decision. Id.
242. RYAN C. BLACK ET AL., U.S. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS AND THEIR AUDIENCES 56-57
(2016).
243. See Pamela C. Corley & Justin Wedeking, The (Dis)Advantage of Certainty: The Im-
portance of Certainty in Language, 48 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 35, 36-37 (2014).
244. Definition adopted from Jonathan P. Kastellec, Panel Composition and Judicial
Compliance on the US Courts of Appeals, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 421, 422 (2007).
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“whistleblower” on the panel—“a judge whose policy preferences
differ from the majority’s and who will expose the majority’s manip-
ulation or disregard of the applicable legal doctrine” to a higher
court—can constrain his or her colleagues from behaving in accord
with their own preferences.245 Some studies find evidence of this
phenomenon,246 while others offer other explanations for moderation
among judges serving on an ideologically mixed panel. “Dissent
aversion,” which I just mentioned, is an example of the latter.247
Cross and Tiller’s study, and work following from it, focuses on
the U.S. courts of appeals, in which judges decide cases in panels of
three (except in those cases heard en banc). Collegial effects,
though, are not limited to courts sitting in panels. The Caldeira et
al. study of certiorari is an example of collegial effects on a court
that sits en banc.248 And other studies demonstrate that Justices try
to influence one another through memoranda249 and that group
effects also play a role in the Chief Justice’s assignment of the ma-
jority opinion. A formal model developed by Jeffrey Lax and Charles
Cameron, for example, yields a prediction that the Chief Justice will
favor Justices more (ideologically) extreme than himself in part
because “more extreme writers must invest more heavily in judicial
craftsmanship, in order to hold the majority.”250 All in all, these
studies demonstrate that a Justice’s choices might have been differ-
ent if the outcome depended on only his behavior and not on the
behavior of his eight other colleagues.
Cross and Tiller’s line of work mostly draws attention (yet again)
to ideological motivations.251 But some research also considers panel
effects relating to gender and race.252 The question in these studies
245. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2156, 2174
(1998).
246. E.g., Kastellec, supra note 244, at 423.
247. See supra notes 223-27 and accompanying text.
248. See Caldeira, Wright & Zorn, supra note 208, at 550.
249. See, e.g., Paul J. Wahlbeck et al., Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and Accommo-
dation on the United States Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294, 295-96 (1998).
250. Jeffrey R. Lax & Charles M. Cameron, Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the US
Supreme Court, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 276, 293 (2007).
251. See Cross & Tiller, supra note 245, at 2155-56.
252. E.g., Cox & Miles, supra note 173, at 4; Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional
Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision
Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299, 299-300 (2004); Jonathan R. Kastellec, Racial Diversity
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is whether traditional judges (usually defined as white, male, or
both) vote differently when they are on a panel with, say, a female
or a black judge. The answer is that they do, though the effect might
be limited to a particular set of cases.253 In our analysis of gender
and judging, for example, we find gender effects only in gender-
based employment suits.254 A male judge tends to be more plaintiff-
friendly when sitting with a female than when he sits with two
other males.255
6. The Hierarchy of Justice
Studies of the hierarchy of justice explore interactions between
higher and lower courts and so are related to literature on the col-
legial court. The efficacy of whistleblowing, for example, hinges on
the ability of a higher court to reverse the decision of a lower
court.256
Many of the studies make use of principal-agent theory, which, in
this literature, assumes heterogeneous ideological preferences be-
tween upper and lower court judges and emphasizes how a higher
court can extract conformity from a lower court with different pref-
erences.257 More concretely, the typical starting point in these
papers is that lower court judges no less than higher court judges
are interested in etching their political values into law.258 But lower
court judges face a substantial constraint in their quest to do so: the
and Judicial Influence on Appellate Courts, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 167, 168 (2013).
253. See, e.g., Cox & Miles, supra note 173, at 4 (“When a white judge sits on a panel with
at least one African-American judge, she becomes roughly 20 percentage points more likely
to find a section 2 violation.”); Farhang & Wawro, supra note 252, at 324 (“[M]ale judges vote
more liberally when one woman serves on a panel with them as compared to all-male
panels.”); Kastellec, supra note 252, at 167 (“Randomly assigning a black counterjudge—a
black judge sitting with two nonblack judges—to a three-judge panel of the Courts of Appeals
nearly ensures that the panel will vote in favor of an affirmative action program.”).
254. Boyd, Epstein & Martin, supra note 106, at 406.
255. Literature also looks at collegial effects on other choices judges make, including their
behavior during oral arguments, which can be conceptualized as part of the deliberative pro-
cess. See, e.g., BLACK ET AL., supra note 181, at 3-5; WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 181, at ix-xi;
Epstein et al., supra note 181, at 433.
256. See, e.g., Cross & Tiller, supra note 245, at 2174.
257. I adopt this discussion from Chad Westerland et al., Strategic Defiance and Compli-
ance in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 891, 891-92 (2010). 
258. See id.
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possibility of sanctioning from a higher court. To the extent that
higher courts cannot hire, fire, promote, demote, financially reward,
or penalize members of trial or intermediate courts, the studies
propose various mechanisms for keeping the lower courts honest,
including strategic auditing,259 implicit tournaments among lower
courts,260 en banc review,261 articulating rules rather than stan-
dards,262 and, of course, whistleblowing.263
Other work, though rarer, reverses the usual approach to lower-
higher court relations and attends to the fact that lower court judges
are fully capable of limiting the commands of higher courts by
avoiding, limiting, or even defying them—as many did with the U.S.
Supreme Court’s desegregation decisions.264 In these studies, the
limitation imposed by the hierarchy of justice “comes full circle”:
higher courts “must take into account the reaction of inferior judges,
and lower courts must attempt to divine the counter-reaction” of su-
perior courts.265
However important and interesting this avenue of research—
whether taking a bottom-up or top-down approach—it is not without
its share of detractors.266 In a study I mentioned earlier, Pauline
Kim questions models that rest on the assumption of ideological
value conflicts between lower and higher courts on the ground that
259. E.g., Charles M. Cameron et al., Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An
Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101,
101 (2000); Matt Spitzer & Eric Talley, Judicial Auditing, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 649, 650-51
(2000).
260. See McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the
Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1634-35 (1995).
261. See Tom S. Clark, A Principal-Agent Theory of En Banc Review, 25 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
55, 56 (2009).
262. See Joseph L. Smith & James A. Todd, Rules, Standards, and Lower Court Decisions,
3 J.L. & CTS. 257, 258 (2015). 
263. See, e.g., Cross & Tiller, supra note 245, at 2156; Kastellec, supra note 244, at 421.
Beim, Hirsch, and Kastellec connect whistleblowing to en banc review. See Beim et al., supra
note 112.
264. The classic study here is Walter F. Murphy, Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court
Power, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1017, 1018-20. See also Westerland et al., supra note 257, at 891.
265. Murphy, supra note 264, at 1031. 
266. See Kim, supra note 46, at 536-37; see also Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo,
Rethinking the Principal-Agent Theory of Judging, 99 IOWA L. REV. 331, 332-33 (2013). Both
argue that “the principal-agent model does not map so neatly onto the structure of the [feder-
al] judicial hierarchy.” Kim, supra note 46, at 537; see Nash & Pardo, supra, at 337 (quoting
Kim, supra note 46, at 537).
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they “distort the role that law plays in judicial decisionmaking.”267
Rather than assuming that “judges are primarily motivated by their
policy preferences,” she suggests that: 
[We] might view judges as engaged in an interaction that
involves both elements of cooperation and conflict in a type of
mixed-motive coordination game. From this perspective, judges
share a common goal—the production of a (relatively) coherent
body of rules that can govern primary behavior in the real world
and is viewed as authoritative.268
Kim’s account does not deny that judges are “making law”; it simply
suggests that they are doing it in a cooperative way so as to enhance
their decisions and institutional legitimacy.269 Her insights strike
me as so sensible (and realistic) that future work should pay heed.
Finally, I should note that Kim is not the only one who has sought
to move the focus from ideology to other factors that may affect rela-
tions between lower and upper courts. In a provocative article, Maya
Sen demonstrates that U.S. courts of appeals panels are more likely
to overturn the decisions of black district court judges than those of
similar white judges.270 Equally interesting are the results of Jordi
Blanesi Vidal and Clare Leaver’s study of English courts, showing
favoritism in the review process.271 Their results are reminiscent of
an earlier article demonstrating that U.S. Supreme Court Justices
tend to affirm cases coming from the courts of appeals where they
served.272
7. Executives and Legislatures
Much of the work on the relationship between courts and elected
actors bears a family resemblance to the hierarchy of justice studies
267. Kim, supra note 46, at 538.
268. Id. at 572 (footnote omitted).
269. Id. at 575.
270. Maya Sen, Is Justice Really Blind? Race and Reversal in US Courts, 44 J. LEGAL STUD.
S187, S220-21 (2015).
271. Jordi Blanes i Vidal & Clare Leaver, Bias in Open Peer-Review: Evidence from the
English Superior Courts, 31 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 431, 435-36 (2015).
272. Lee Epstein et al., Circuit Effects: How the Norm of Federal Judicial Experience Biases
the Supreme Court, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 873-77 (2009). 
2064 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:2017
in that it too uses a strategic framework to explore their interac-
tions. In this literature, the judges must attend to the preferences
and likely actions of the government if the judges are to achieve
their goals, which are usually framed in ideological or institutional
terms.273 If they do not, they run the risk of retaliation from elected
actors, thereby making it difficult for judges to establish enduring
policy, or maintain legitimacy.274
A fair amount of empirical research validates this claim in the
statutory context.275 This makes sense: when the U.S. federal courts
interpret statutes, Congress can override their interpretations by
enacting new law. But what of constitutional review? Although Con-
gress cannot pass legislation to overturn decisions reached by courts
on constitutional grounds,276 it can take aim at courts in other ways:
withdrawing their jurisdiction, eradicating judicial review, approv-
ing constitutional amendments to overturn decisions, slashing the
court’s budget, and impeaching judges.277 These threats, I hasten to
note, are not merely theoretical. Tom Clark’s study identifies nearly
nine hundred court-curbing proposals in the U.S. Congress between
1877 and 2008.278 More to the point, his work, along with an article
by Jeffrey Segal and his colleagues,279 demonstrates that when Con-
gress threatens the Supreme Court’s authority, the Court cowers,
273. E.g., John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpre-
tation, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 263, 263-64 (1992); Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational
Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and
Grove City Cases, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 263, 295-96 (1990).
274. See Gely & Spiller, supra note 273, at 265.
275. See, e.g., Mario Bergara et al., Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making:
The Congressional Constraint, 28 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 247, 248 (2003); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 403 (1999);
Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael Gely, Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Deter-
minants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988, 23 RAND J. ECON. 463,
465 (1992). But see Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of
Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28, 42-43 (1997). 
276. At least not in theory. In practice, the United States Congress has enacted over forty
statutes designed to reverse Supreme Court decisions that invalidated federal or state laws.
See James Meernik & Joseph Ignagni, Judicial Review and Coordinate Construction of the
Constitution, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 447, 458-59 (1997).
277. See Rosenberg, supra note 162, at 376-77.
278. Tom S. Clark, The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy, 53
AM. J. POL. SCI. 971, 979 (2009).
279. Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Congress, the Supreme Court, and Judicial Review: Testing a
Constitutional Separation of Powers Model, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 89 (2011).
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exercising greater judicial self-restraint or reaching decisions closer
to congressional preferences.280
These studies focus on the United States. In parts of the develop-
ing world, governments have taken even more radical steps to tame
their courts, with sanctions ranging from impeachment, removal,
and court packing, to criminal indictment, physical violence, and
even death. Helmke’s study and other work running along similar
lines show that judges respond to these potential threats by defect-
ing against the old regime,281 avoiding cases that may contribute to
further escalation,282 going public,283 and passing up posts on apex
courts altogether,284 among other strategies.
8. Litigants, Attorneys, and Interest Groups
Under this category fall many different kinds of studies. One set
addresses questions such as whether, where, and how to litigate.285
Much of this work tends to focus on the choices made by external
actors rather than on the judges’ behavior—although, of course, the
choices courts and judges have made (or are likely to make) figure
into the actors’ calculations.286
Two other strands make a tighter connection between litigants/
lawyers and judging. One focuses on the parties, asking whether
certain types are more likely than others to win in court. Many of
these studies follow from Marc Galanter’s classic article Why the
“Haves” Come Out Ahead287—and there are piles of them, whether
280. See Clark, supra note 278, at 981; Segal et al., supra note 279, at 99-100.
281. See Helmke, supra note 63, at 296-98.
282. See Epstein et al., supra note 79, at 131.
283. See Varun Gauri et al., The Costa Rican Supreme Court’s Compliance Monitoring Sys-
tem, 77 J. POL. 774, 775-76 (2015).
284. See Santiago Basabe-Serrano, Judges Without Robes and Judicial Voting in Contexts
of Institutional Instability: The Case of Ecuador’s Constitutional Court, 1999-2007, 44 J. LATIN
AM. STUD. 127, 156-58 (2012).
285. E.g., William H.J. Hubbard, An Empirical Study of the Effect of Shady Grove v. All-
state on Forum Shopping in the New York Courts, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 151 (2013); George
L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1984).
286. However, Daniel Klerman’s work on forum selling demonstrates that judges conscious-
ly encourage litigants to file in their districts. E.g., Daniel Klerman, Personal Jurisdiction and
Product Liability, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1551 (2012); Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Sell-
ing, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2016).
287. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
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on courts in the United States288 or abroad.289 As far as I can tell,
most tend to confirm Galanter’s hypothesis that the courts favor “re-
peat players” over “one-shotters.”290
Another related strand focuses on whether lawyering has an ef-
fect on judicial decisions. In one clever study, the authors used a
Justice’s notes from oral arguments, which graded the attorneys, to
find out whether their arguments make any difference.291 They do.
For years, social scientists have been studying whether amicus cu-
riae briefs filed by interest groups influence the Supreme Court.
Although some judges say no,292 recent research points in a different
direction. Janet Box-Steffensmeier et al., for example, show that the
ability of groups to influence the Court depends on the group.293
“Groups who are more connected with other interest groups and col-
laborate with other well-connected groups ... have a greater effect on
the probability that a [J]ustice votes in their favor, compared to ...
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
288. See, e.g., Ryan C. Black & Christina L. Boyd, US Supreme Court Agenda Setting and
the Role of Litigant Status, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 286 (2012); Reginald S. Sheehan et al.,
Ideology, Status, and the Differential Success of Direct Parties Before the Supreme Court, 86
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 464 (1992); Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Who Wins on Ap-
peal? Upperdogs and Underdogs in the United States Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI.
235 (1992).
289. See, e.g., Kong-Pin Chen et al., Party Capability Versus Court Preference: Why Do the
“Haves” Come Out Ahead?—An Empirical Lesson from the Taiwan Supreme Court, 31 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 93 (2015); Stacia L. Haynie, Resource Inequalities and Litigation Outcomes in
the Philippine Supreme Court, 56 J. POL. 752 (1994); Xin He & Yang Su, Do the “Haves” Come
Out Ahead in Shanghai Courts?, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 120 (2013).
290. See Galanter, supra note 287, at 97-104. But see Yoav Dotan, Do the “Haves” Still
Come Out Ahead? Resource Inequalities in Ideological Courts: The Case of the Israeli High
Court of Justice, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1059, 1059-61 (1999).
291. Timothy R. Johnson et al., The Influence of Oral Arguments on the U.S. Supreme
Court, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 99 (2006).
292. Judge Posner once wrote: 
After 16 years of reading amicus curiae briefs the vast majority of which have
not assisted the judges, I have decided that it would be good to scrutinize these
motions in a more careful, indeed a fish-eyed, fashion.
The vast majority of amicus curiae briefs are filed by allies of litigants and
duplicate the arguments made in the litigants’ briefs, in effect merely extending
the length of the litigant’s brief. Such amicus briefs should not be allowed. They
are an abuse.
Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997).
293. See Box-Steffensmeier et al., supra note 114.
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groups who participate on their own” or collaborate with less well-
connected groups.294
And now there has been a spate of research suggesting that a
small group of elite private-sector lawyers not only have been “dom-
inating advocacy” before the Supreme Court,295 but have been
enormously successful in gaining access and in winning their cases
on the merits.296 Much of this research is descriptive, meaning that
it does not attend to other factors that could explain the lawyers’
success. So we will have to wait to see if the findings hold up under
more systematic analysis, though I suspect they will. These lawyers
are, after all, quintessential “repeat players.”
9. Public Opinion and Macroevents
There are at least two ways to think about the relationship be-
tween the public and the court: First, how do court decisions affect
the public;297 and second, how does the public affect courts.298
Though the first results from judicial behavior, the second relates
more directly to the choices judges make.
294. Id. at 458. Other studies also found some influence of amici. See, e.g., PAUL M.
COLLINS, JR., FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT: INTEREST GROUPS AND JUDICIAL DECISION
MAKING (2008); Paul M. Collins, Jr. & Wendy L. Martinek, Judges and Friends: The Influence
of Amici Curiae on U.S. Court of Appeals Judges, 43 AM. POL. RES. 255 (2015).
295. Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court:
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1487 (2008).
296. See, e.g., id.; see also Joan Biskupic et al., The Echo Chamber, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2014,
10:30 AM), http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus/ [https://perma.cc/J3BU-
C5WF].
297. The classic work is Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican Schoolmaster:
The U.S. Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 751, 768 (1989)
(finding that the Court’s decisions have an impact on the public but that the impact manifests
itself as both increased support and increased opposition for the position taken by the Court’s
majority). For more recent work reaching much the same conclusion as Franklin and Kosaki,
see Aziz Z. Huq & Avital Mentovich, The Polarizing Court (2015) (unpublished paper), http://
law.huji.ac.il/upload/ThePolarizingCourtAvitalMentovich.pdf [https://perma.cc/XH4F-56F9].
298. There are others. James L. Gibson has generated a large body of work on the
legitimacy of courts. See, e.g., James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism
Damaged the Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 195 (2011); James
L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, Is the U.S. Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Grounded in Perform-
ance Satisfaction and Ideology?, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 162 (2015); James L. Gibson et al., On the
Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343 (1998); James L. Gibson et al.,
The Supreme Court and the US Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or
Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535 (2003).
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Barry Friedman’s book,299 mentioned previously, provides a
reasonable point of departure in this line of research.300 Using quali-
tative data and historical methods, Friedman provides an unequivo-
cal answer to the question of whether “we the people” influence the
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court: we do. Large-n studies do not
disagree. At the risk of generalizing, they tend to find that when the
“mood of the public” is liberal (or conservative), the Court is signif-
icantly more likely to issue liberal (or conservative) decisions.301 But
why is the real question. Friedman posits that the Justices bend to
the will of the people because the Court requires public support to
remain an efficacious branch of government.302 The existing quan-
titative studies could be read to support this view, but they are
equally consistent with another mechanism: that “the people” in-
cludes the Justices. On this account, the Justices do not respond to
public opinion directly but rather respond to the same events or
forces that affect the opinion of other members of the public.303
The “macroevent” studies raise a similar question.304 Several
systematic analyses, for example, find that Justices are more defer-
ential to the government (or the President) in times of war.305 But
299. FRIEDMAN, supra note 53. 
300. It is not, however, the first to tackle the question of whether the public influences the
Court. See, e.g., Micheal W. Giles et al., The Supreme Court in American Democracy:
Unraveling the Linkages Between Public Opinion and Judicial Decision Making, 70 J. POL.
293 (2008); Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited:
New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018 (2004);
William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Model, and Supreme
Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective, 58 J. POL. 169 (1996).
301. E.g., Giles et al., supra note 300, at 303-04; McGuire & Stimson, supra note 300, at
1033; Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 300, at 196-98.
302. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, at 383.
303. That is why we titled our paper (written for a symposium on Professor Friedman’s
book), Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court? Possibly Yes (But We’re Not Sure
Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 263 (2010). For a possible answer (supportive of Friedman’s argu-
ment), see Christopher J. Casillas et al., How Public Opinion Constrains the U.S. Supreme
Court, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 74 (2011).
304. I focus here on war, but there is also a nascent body of literature that looks at the
effect of the economy on judicial decisions. See, e.g., Thomas Brennan et al., Economic Trends
and Judicial Outcomes: A Macrotheory of the Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1191 (2009); Douglas Rice,
On Courts and Pocketbooks: Macroeconomic Judicial Behavior Across Methods of Judicial
Selection, 2 J.L. & CTS. 327 (2014); Nancy Staudt & Yilei He, The Macroeconomic Court:
Rhetoric and Implications of New Deal Decision-Making, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 87 (2010).
305. See, e.g., NANCY STAUDT, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE PURSE: HOW COURTS FUND
NATIONAL DEFENSE IN TIMES OF CRISIS (2011); Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court During
Crisis: How War Affects Only Non-War Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 109-10 (2005); William G.
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again the mechanism is not clear. Do the Justices believe that they
should take a back seat to the elected branches during wartime, or,
again, are they swept up in “[t]he great tides and currents which
engulf the rest of men,” as Cardozo put it?306 No doubt future studies
will attempt to solve what amounts to a tricky problem of behavioral
equivalence.
10. Implementation and Efficacy of Judicial Decisions
I see three interrelated research topics in this category. One fo-
cuses on systematically assessing the effect of particular judicial
decisions.307 I have already mentioned the Twombly/Iqbal stud-
ies,308 and there may be just as many on the impact of Citizens
United.309 A second set focuses on the actors who must implement,
or comply with, court decisions.310 Sometimes these are lower court
judges; think Twiqbal, or more famously, Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.311 But many times the implementors are federal agencies, state
actors, and, of course, the public.312
Howell & Faisal Z. Ahmed, Voting for the President: The Supreme Court During War, 30 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 39, 68 (2014).
306. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921). 
307. Of course, no review on the effect of judicial decisions would be complete without
mentioning GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (2d ed. 1991), which at its core asks whether courts are effective policymakers, and
whether courts can yield social change. His answer is generally no: courts cannot generate
large-scale social change unless the ruling regime supports them. The Hollow Hope spawned
an enormous literature, much of which is qualitative or descriptive.
308. See supra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
309. E.g., Wendy L. Hansen et al., The Effects of Citizens United on Corporate Spending
in the 2012 Presidential Election, 77 J. POL. 535 (2015); Raymond J. La Raja & Brian F.
Schaffner, The Effects of Campaign Finance Spending Bans on Electoral Outcomes: Evidence
from the States about the Potential Impact of Citizens United v. FEC, 33 ELECTORAL STUD.
102 (2014); Douglas M. Spencer & Abby K. Wood, Citizens United, States Divided: An Empir-
ical Analysis of Independent Political Spending, 89 IND. L.J. 315 (2014); Timothy Werner, The
Sound, the Fury, and the Nonevent: Business Power and Market Reactions to the Citizens
United Decision, 39 AM. POL. RES. 118 (2011).
310. See generally BRADLEY C. CANNON & CHARLES A. JOHNSON, JUDICIAL POLICIES:
IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT (2d ed. 1999).
311. See, e.g., Giles & Walker, supra note 170.
312. See, e.g., Susan B. Hansen, State Implementation of Supreme Court Decisions: Abor-
tion Rates Since Roe v. Wade, 42 J. POL. 371, 379 (1980); Rachael K. Hinkle, Into the Words:
Using Statutory Text to Explore the Impact of Federal Courts on State Policy Diffusion, 59 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 1002 (2015); James F. Spriggs, II, Explaining Federal Bureaucratic Compliance
with Supreme Court Opinions, 50 POL. RES. Q. 567 (1997).
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The third set of studies provides the strongest link to judicial
behavior. This work focuses on how judges attempt to ensure that
their decisions are efficacious. Staton and Vanberg focused on this
idea in their article on vague versus clear opinion writing that I
mentioned earlier.313 And Staton has continued this line of work in
a collaborative project with the Constitutional Chamber of the Costa
Rican Supreme Court, which began a program of monitoring com-
pliance with some of its decisions.314 In reviewing data generated
from the monitoring, Staton and his colleagues found “that vague
orders, and orders issued without definite time frames for compli-
ance, were associated with delayed implementation.”315 Along
somewhat different lines, Matthew Hall finds that even the U.S.
Supreme Court, a court with very high legitimacy, worries about
compliance with its decisions because the Court depends on nonju-
dicial actors for implementation.316
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE
My goal was to provide a taste of the literature available, but I
am not sure I have even accomplished that. There is so much more
to say. But rather than go on and on about the past and current
state of thinking on judicial behavior, let me end with some
thoughts on the future. Certainly, I see challenges moving forward.
However exciting the entry of many disciplines into the field, it
inevitably raises right hand-left hand problems. Keeping up with a
literature developing so fast across so many disciplines is hard
work. And even if the various communities can locate each other’s
studies, there is no guarantee that they will understand them, what
with all the jargon (most especially, and unfortunately, in my own
discipline of political science). Likewise, the worldwide attention,
although wonderful in so many ways, has its share of difficulties,
notably language and data barriers, that make the sharing and
development of knowledge more difficult.
313. Staton & Vanberg, supra note 19, at 505.
314. See Gauri et al., supra note 283.
315. Id. at 774. 
316. Matthew E.K. Hall, The Semiconstrained Court: Public Opinion, the Separation of
Powers, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Fear of Nonimplementation, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 352,
364 (2014).
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But I do not want to dwell on the challenges, which we will inev-
itably find ways to meet. I want to focus on possible directions—one
on theory, the other on data.
Starting with theory, as you can probably tell from the work I
reviewed in Part II, many studies operate under the assumption
that the judge “is a rational maximizer of his ends in life, his sat-
isfactions—... his ‘self-interest.’”317 My own view is that this is a
reasonable assumption or at least gets us pretty far in understand-
ing judicial behavior. But it will not get us all the way. It is just too
late in the day to question the decades’ worth of studies showing
that in many situations, people rely heavily on their intuitions to
make fast decisions without much effort. Social psychologists tell us
that these responses are not always wrong or even unhelpful.318 But
we also know that unchecked by deliberative assessments, they can
lead to mistakes and biased decisions.
Although judges may think they can “suppress or convert” their
intuitions, prejudices, sympathies, and the like into rational deci-
sions,319 the experiments I mentioned earlier by the Rachlinski team
suggest that this is not the case. Their studies have documented
that judges respond more favorably to litigants they like or with
whom they sympathize,320 are affected by “anchors” in making nu-
meric estimates,321 and fall prey to hindsight bias when assessing
probable cause.322 In short, it turns out that judges are human too.
I take the experimental evidence quite seriously, but some
members of the legal community (especially judges) do not; they
complain that the experiments are artificial and do not capture the
real courtroom environment. This counsels for observational stud-
ies—that is, studies making use of data that the world, not the
researchers, have generated. These are not easy to do, but neither
are they impossible, as Shayo and Zussman’s study of Israeli small
claims courts demonstrates.323 More to the point, I think they are
317. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (8th ed. 2011).
318. See Wistrich et al., supra note 39, at 865-66, 865 n.69, 866 n.70.
319. Id. at 862.
320. Id. at 898-99.
321. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Can Judges Make Reliable Numeric Judgments? Dis-
torted Damages and Skewed Sentences, 90 IND. L.J. 695, 696, 736 (2015). 
322. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Probable Cause, Probability, and Hindsight, 8 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 72, 75-76 (2011).
323. See Shayo & Zussman, supra note 93.
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crucial: should the experimental and the observational converge, we
can be far more confident in our conclusions.
Turning to data, in Part I.C I pointed out that our datasets have
improved dramatically. We now have fabulous public, multiuser
databases—including, of course, the U.S. Supreme Court Database.
I have no doubt that we will continue to rely on these databases
to gain great insight into judicial behavior. At the same time, we
have long ignored the most obvious feature of what we study: the
actual texts that judges produce.324 Happily, this is changing. Al-
though the automated analysis of learning about judicial behavior
got off to (what I see as) an unfortunate start,325 we are back on
track with some very innovative work. I have already pointed to
studies analyzing the clarity of judicial opinions; there are others
too. Hinkle et al. examined the word choices of district court judges
to see if they were more likely to use “hedging” language when they
were out of ideological alignment with their circuit in an effort to
avoid reversal.326 Susan Haire et al. found that court of appeals
panels “composed of a majority of women or minorities produced
opinions with significantly more points of law” than panels with
three white males.327
These examples focus on the text of judicial opinions, but we
certainly do not need to limit ourselves to judicial texts. Imagine
analyzing oral argument transcripts to learn about emotions;328
briefs to analyze truthfulness; and Twitter feeds to assess public
sentiment.329
324. Creating databases and automating text analysis are not mutually exclusive. In fact,
scholars are now systematically scraping information from court decisions to produce data-
bases. See, e.g., Matthew E.K. Hall & Jason Harold Windett, New Data on State Supreme
Court Cases, 13 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. (2013).
325. I think here of the application of Wordscores—a program developed to analyze party
manifestos in Europe—to judicial decisions. Among other problems, judicial decisions do not
analogize well to party manifestos. LIWC, which I mentioned earlier, seems more promising,
but it too is not perfect, in part because its dictionaries were not designed for legal texts.
326. Hinkle et al., supra note 182, at 407. They are.
327. Haire et al., supra note 182, at 303.
328. Work is already underway. See Ryan C. Black et al., Emotions, Oral Arguments, and
Supreme Court Decision Making, 73 J. POL. 572 (2011).
329. This project is also in progress. See Tom S. Clark et al., Revealed Public Opinion on
Twitter: The Supreme Court of the United States Same-Sex Marriage Decisions (Mar. 31,
2014) (unpublished paper), http://polisci.emory.edu/faculty/jkstato/resources/WorkingPapers/
changeintwitteropinion.pdf [https://perma.cc/KCK9-F367].
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The possibilities seem limitless. Though I doubt C. Herman Prit-
chett would have been surprised, I like to think he would have been
pleased.
